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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Franz Brentano is a European philosopher who is less well-
known than, for instance, Ludwig Wittgenstein or Rudolf Car-
nap, but who nevertheless gave rise to philosophical schools 
which have proved to be of the first importance in contemporary 
philosophy. Above all, Brentano was the teacher of Husserl, and 
it was Brentano’s work on the concept of being in Aristotle 
which motivated Heidegger to take up a philosophical career. 
Brentano has thus done much to determine the shape and tenor of 
what is usually called Continental philosophy—the philosophy 
of, first of all, Germany and France in the twentieth century. 
Through his Polish student, Kasimir Twardowski, Brentano 
helped to shape contemporary Polish thought—and here we are 
thinking especially of Polish logic—into one of the most impres-
sive developments in the history of philosophy. Brentano’s own 
thought on the other hand, alongside that of his Austrian pupil 
Alexius Meinong, has become an important factor in contempo-
rary Anglo-American analytic philosophy, not least through the 
writings of Roderick Chisholm on the concept of intentionality.  
In what follows we shall introduce the English translation of 
what is perhaps Brentano’s most important text on the history of 
philosophy. In our introduction, we shall analyze Brentano’s 
conception of what he called “the four phases of philosophy”; we 
shall show the origin of his theory and the problems it was de-
signed to address; and we shall demonstrate that Brentano’s theo-
ry can be applied to at least one line in the history of philosophy 
after Brentano’s time.  
That Brentano developed his own theory of the history of phi-
losophy is not widely known. This theory is summarized in a 
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short essay entitled “The Four Phases of Philosophy”, published 
in 1895 and translated here as an Appendix. Brentano believed 
that the history of philosophy displays a regularly recurring pat-
tern and can thus be divided into successive periods, each of 
which can be considered as an organic whole of a precisely de-
termined form. Such periods are for instance the period of classi-
cal Greek philosophy ending with Aristotle, the medieval period 
up to but not including Descartes, and the period of modern phi-
losophy beginning with Descartes and ending with Hegel and 
other classical ‘German idealist’ thinkers. In each such period, 
Brentano argues, four phases can be distinguished: the first phase 
is that of intensive philosophical development, of scientific re-
sults and scientific interest; the second phase is dominated by 
practical interest; the third phase is that of increasing scepticism 
which gives way, in the end, to a last phase, in which philosophy 
becomes a mere branch of literature which has no scientific rele-
vance at all.  
Brentano’s theory of the history of philosophy is based on the 
idea that philosophy is a science, and that the method of philoso-
phy is identical with the method of the other sciences. Philoso-
phy is a science for two reasons. First, it has a determinate sub-
ject-matter, which is in Brentano’s eyes the structure and func-
tion of human cognition; and second, it has a determinate meth-
od, which is in no way different from the method of the other 
sciences, both as concerns its logical coherence and rigour, and 
also as concerns the requisite clarity of its formulations.  
We shall therefore begin, in Part One, by investigating Bren-
tano’s understanding of the history of philosophy and of philoso-
phy as science. We shall then consider the emergence of Brenta-
no’s theory of the four phases and evaluate this theory in the 
light of competing approaches to the problem of the history of 
philosophy. We shall conclude, in Part Two, by demonstrating 
that Brentano’s theory can be applied also to the development of 
philosophy in our own century. 
 3 
PART ONE: BRENTANO’S THEORY 
1. Brentano on Philosophy and Its History 
Many currently popular thinkers see philosophy as a kind of 
artistic or literary activity. Richard Rorty, for instance, suggests 
in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature that philosophy 
should be considered as the art or method of ‘making connec-
tions’ between cultures, languages, conceptions, and the like, 
rather than as the sum of logical or epistemological efforts to 
ground or establish certain propositions as true. ‘Making connec-
tions’ for Rorty is, first of all, a kind of dialectical process, a 
never-ending discourse on themes and topics taken from the his-
tory of philosophy, a conversation that has a merely educational 
purpose. Philosophy is an activity of edification, and as such it is 
not subject to the criteria of truth or validity.1 The history of phi-
losophy, too, is not the history of true or false ideas in or about 
philosophy, but rather a collection of views which might be used 
for the mental or moral improvement of human beings. 
Jacques Derrida, similarly, is convinced that the history of 
philosophy is nothing more than a bunch of wrong ideas con-
cerning the nature of a spurious ‘reality’ (though he still for some 
some reason treats it as material of a sort which needs to be sup-
plied with footnotes and commentaries of the most diverse 
scholarly sort). Derrida’s main concern is not with what people 
in the past might have thought—their ideas were in any case 
 
1 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1980, p. 360. 
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condemned to falsehood from the start because of the effects of 
what he calls ‘logocentrism’. Rather he is concerned with how 
we can interpret or misinterpret these ideas in accordance with 
the present interests of this or that centre of power or potential 
power.2  
Rorty’s idea of the history of philosophy is based on Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s conception of hermeneutics as the genuine or 
true form of philosophy—philosophy as a project of mutual in-
terpretation. Derrida, on the other hand, reformulates the later 
Heidegger’s criticism of the history of philosophy, a criticism 
which (through its Nietzschean admixtures) is designated to be so 
so radical as to lead to the very elimination of philosophy and to 
give rise to a new type of purely rhetorical thinking. In both cas-
es we meet an interesting paradox: both Rorty and Derrida speak 
of the history of philosophy in terms of a radically new concep-
tion which fulfils, and at the same time condemns, the history of 
philosophy as traditionally conceived. In order to reach their aim, 
aim, they announce the end of the history of philosophy on the 
one hand (that is, for them, the end of philosophy as such). Yet 
on the other hand they claim to have found a new variant of phi-
losophy itself, either in terms of ‘edification’ or in terms of liber-
ationary political rhetoric. Both agree that the history of philoso-
phy is a history of misunderstandings and misinterpretations and 
that the time has come to reveal this fact. At the same time both 
insist that they have found the means by which we can gain ac-
cess to the genuine history of our subject—like Marxists expos-
ing the ‘false consciousness’ by which all humanity has hitherto 
been plagued. 
Brentano, too, believed himself to have found the right form 
and method of philosophy, though his understanding of the sub-
ject is much more complex and more deeply rooted in the tradi-
tion—and above all less self-serving—than those of Rorty or 
Derrida. For unlike Rorty and Derrida, and unlike Heidegger, 
 
2 See Jacques Derrida, De la grammatologie, Paris, 1967, Introduction. 
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Brentano rejects any form of ‘endism’ in the history of philoso-
phy, denying any simple or linear teleology which would give 
special status to what happen to be currently fashionable views. 
Instead, Brentano adopts a cyclical view of the history of philos-
ophy, a view to the effect that philosophy, however close to the 
truth it might be at any given stage, is condemned, in a never-
ending struggle, to the subsequent revival of positions remote 
from, and indeed antithetical to, the truth. Brentano’s views in 
this regard are themselves, as we shall see, in some respects one-
sided and oversimplified. They are of interest, however, as the 
definitive expression of what we might think of as the cyclical 
view of the history of philosophy—and they can be of great prac-
tical value in this light, as tools with which to criticize and evalu-
ate rival theories in the history of philosophy.  
Philosophy and Its Subject-Matter 
Philosophy, like every other discipline, has its own specific 
subject-matter. Its main field is what Brentano termed ‘inner 
perception’.3 Our consciousness, in Brentano’s view, is also self-
consciousness, which means that it lies in the nature of mental 
life to be accompanied by a reflective awareness of its own con-
stituent mental acts and processes. To avoid the danger of an 
infinite regress (of reflections on reflections and so on ad infini-
tum), Brentano maintained that such inner perception occurs ‘on 
the side’ or en parergo, as he expresses it using an Aristotelian 
term. Inner perception is thus to be sharply contrasted with that 
deliberate process of focusing on the events of one’s inner life 
which we might call ‘introspection’ or ‘inner observation’. The 
latter operates on the basis of short-term memory and treats men-
tal phenomena in separation from their context as pale petrifacta. 
 
3 Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, Erster Band, Leipzig, Dun-
cker and Humblot, 1874, p. 35. English translation: Psychology from an Em-
pirical Standpoint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1913, p. 35. 
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In inner perception, on the other hand, mental phenomena are 
given simultaneously and as they are in themselves; they are not 
artificially abstracted by the one who perceives them. Philoso-
phy, in Brentano’s eyes, is concerned with the general laws that 
govern mental phenomena, and the first task of philosophy is to 
establish the existence and nature of these laws on the basis of 
inner perception.  
Inner perception is marked, for Brentano as for Descartes, 
with the quality of indubitable evidence. Because there is no gap, 
in the case of inner perception, between the act of knowledge and 
and the object known, so also there is no point at which error 
could enter. Inner perception can thus serve as the starting point 
for philosophy conceived in classical foundationalist fashion. It 
can provide the disciple of philosophy with a basis of strictly 
necessary first principles, which are not derived from other prin-
ciples but rather are directly given up with ‘one strike’, as Bren-
tano puts it.4 Such principles can then be applied to various spe-
cial fields in philosophy, such as ethics or metaphysics. In this 
sense, philosophy, besides being a special science of inner per-
ception, is also a universal science of the first principles of 
knowledge. 
A mental phenomenon can be just as precisely described and 
analysed as can the objects of the natural sciences. A description, 
however, cannot in every case claim the status of indubitability. 
The particular facts which are grasped in their psychic or—as 
Brentano puts it—‘intentional’ form, as contents of our mental 
life, remain particular and cannot serve as principles of a genuine 
science. We can point to certain isolated rules concerning the 
behaviour of such particular facts, but the character of these 
rules, inasmuch as they are established inductively, remains 
problematic. No problematic rule can serve, according to Brenta-
 
4 Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1934, note 
33. English translation: The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969. 
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no, as a basis of a genuine science. There are, however, certain 
necessary laws which are capable of being ‘discovered’ in an 
intuitive way in inner perception. Examples would be that a 
judgement presupposes a presentation of that which is judged; 
that judgement but not presentation can be either positive or neg-
ative, and so on. These yield what is in the last analysis the most 
genuine form of knowledge, inasmuch as only this form of 
knowledge possesses strict necessity.5  
Such strict necessity is, according to Brentano, a feature of the 
the judgements of inner perception which cannot be influenced 
by the subject; the subject can only accept it and apply it as a 
point of reference in his evaluation of other judgements 
concerning reality. Strict necessity is perceived ‘in the soul’; yet 
its necessary character is not dependent on psychophysical 
processes. Brentano thus sees himself as safe against the charge 
of ‘psychologism’ raised by Husserl and Frege against those who 
sought to eliminate strict necessity in favour of contingent truths 
of empirical psychology.6 
Stages in the History of Sciences 
The history of any science, according to Brentano, can be di-
vided into two stages. In the first, preparatory stage, the science 
 
5 Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (History of Greek Philosophy), 
edited by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand, Bern-Munich: Francke, 1967, Intro-
duction, p. 5. 
6 See Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene (English transla-
tion included in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, op. cit., under the 
title “On the Classification of Mental Phenomena”), Leipzig: Duncker und 
Humblot, 1911, p. 167. See also Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, 
Erster Band, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993 
(also in Husserliana XVIII). See moreover Wilhelm Schuppe, “Zum Psychol-
ogismus und zum Normcharakter der Logik”, in Hermann Noack (ed.), Hus-
serl, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973, and B. Mezei: 
“Brentano and Psychologism”, Psychologia (Budapest), 2, 1994. 
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itself is not yet clearly distinguished from other disciplines; data 
concerning its special field are collected haphazardly and are not 
readily perceived as belonging to a distinct discipline. The sec-
ond stage starts with an explosion-like development of the sci-
ence, in which its special territory and methods of investigation 
come to be clearly defined. This is what happened to physiology 
and to psychology in the nineteenth century, and this is what 
Brentano hoped would happen to philosophy itself.  
For, as Brentano held, psychology and philosophy are disci-
plines which had been interlinked from the very beginning. Signs 
of this connection are Aristotle’s psychological writings and the 
important psychological observations made by Augustine. Earlier 
thinkers, up to and including the rationalists and empiricists of 
the post-Cartesian period had, however, as Brentano sees it, been 
unable to achieve genuine results because they lacked the proper 
method of investigation—the method of inner perception. Like 
the German psychologist Gustav Theodor Fechner, Brentano 
believed that psychology was destined to help philosophy in the 
realization of its most central goals and to contribute thereby to 
both individual and collective happiness. For, as Brentano held, 
the rapid development of psychology in his day amounted to the 
birth of a new, universal science, one which would help to fulfil 
all the promises of philosophy in its age-long history.  
Philosophy and the Decline of Cultures 
Given what we have said, the history of philosophy and the 
history of the other sciences are similar to each other. In another 
sense, however, philosophy is different from the other sciences. 
In Brentano’s view, the general historical development of the 
other sciences is to a large extent independent of cultural factors. 
Although there are stages of stagnation in the development of a 
given science, there are no stages of collapse or new beginning. 
Philosophy, however, is more directly connected to the cultural 
standards of a given society, to ethical, legal and even political 
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phenomena, and thus philosophy shows a curve of development 
different from the other sciences. In the history of a culture, there 
are stages of rapid decline and stages of flourishing, and the sep-
arate products of a given culture reflect the corresponding state 
of the culture as a whole. Thus also, Brentano held, the history of 
philosophy shows flourishing stages on the one hand, and stages 
of decline on the other.  
Philosophy is distinguished from the other sciences also in the 
following sense. The genuine results attained by the latter during 
periods of rapid development are preserved during subsequent 
periods of stagnation. In the history of philosophy, in contrast, 
there are also declining periods in which important philosophical 
results are forgotten or wilfully neglected or corrupted, and even 
the methods found and followed earlier are replaced by sham or 
inferior alternatives. The result, as Brentano sees it, is that in its 
declining periods philosophy ceases to be a science and becomes 
what is generally termed literature or mysticism. Mysticism is 
understood by Brentano in a pejorative sense and signifies that, 
instead of observing and investigating the facts and laws of psy-
chic life, philosophers make use of their fantasy and construct 
quite arbitrary systems of thought.  
Brentano considered his age to be one of a ‘philosophical re-
naissance’. He struggled on behalf of the conviction that phi-
losophy would from his time on show a development similar to 
that of the various natural sciences: the results obtained by in-
dividual thinkers would automatically become constituent parts 
of a single, ever more visible and more firmly anchored whole. 
Brentano thus fought for the idea that the construction of idio-
syncratic philosophical ‘systems’ would finally come to an end. 
Such systems, Brentano insisted, belonged to periods of decline 
in the history of philosophy. In a period of positive development, 
the philosopher’s task is to carry out the analysis and the solution 
of particular problems in philosophy in such a way that they 
become integrated into that whole which is genuine philosophical 
science.  
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Brentano was however forced to admit that the history of phi-
losophy, in the future as in the past, will likely continue to follow 
a cyclical pattern in a way that resembles the development of the 
arts rather than that of the sciences. Philosophy, in other words, 
will continue to display periods of flourishing alternating with 
periods of decline.7  
The Four Phases of Philosophy 
In Brentano’s view, we can distinguish four periods of rapid 
and intensive progress in the history of philosophy: the age of the 
early Greeks up to the time of Aristotle; the age of the revival of 
Aristotelianism by the scholastic writers in the Middle Ages; the 
age of the Cartesian renewal of philosophy in the seventeenth 
century; and finally Brentano’s own age, in which philosophy 
became intimately connected to scientific psychology. 
As Brentano sees it, there are altogether four phases in each of 
these periods, among which only the first phase meets the re-
quirements of scientific philosophy. A schematized description 
of the phases is as follows: 
1. The first phase is that of rapid progress. Its characteristics 
are the expression of a purely theoretical interest (‘childlike in-
nocence and wonder’, as Brentano puts it) on the one hand, and 
the application of scientific method (openness to the richness of 
empirical cases) on the other.  
2. The second phase is that of practical interest: there pre-
vails, in the philosophical investigation of nature not the search 
 
7 Brentano, like many of his contemporaries, adopts in this respect the 
views of Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768), the German art-
historian and founder of the discipline of art history. Winckelmann developed 
a scientific understanding of the history of the arts in which the first phase—
for Winckelmann: the classical period—displays a quality and style unachiev-
able for subsequent ages. The history of the fine arts is thus a perpetually 
declining process. 
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for truth, but rather the motives of ‘relevance’, social benefit and 
the motives of ‘applied philosophy’.8  
3. The third phase arises as a reaction to the phase of prevail-
ing practicality. It is the phase of scepticism and comes about as 
follows. The practical orientation of the second phase proves 
highly constraining. Since the whole range of human interest 
cannot be satisfied by this selective focus, and since practicality 
questions the meaningfulness of any sphere of interest other than 
its own, a general scepticism concerning the human ability to 
gain knowledge begins to prevail.  
4. The fourth phase, that of mysticism, arises in turn as a reac-
tion to scepticism. Its main characteristic is the invention of new 
methods, the discovery of special ‘powers’ in man through which 
which radically new types of knowledge are deemed to become 
somehow accessible.  
But after all this, there comes again a new phase of radical re-
newal, a return to the original form of philosophical activity, of 
‘innocence and wonder’, and so the cycle repeats itself. The 
whole process is thus not one of decline, but rather that of a re-
curring cycle—periods of development interrupted by periods of 
decline. In this way, Brentano seeks an equilibrium between the 
view of the history of philosophy as a declining process—of the 
sort held by Romantic philosophers—and a view of the history of 
of philosophy as a perpetual development of the sort favoured by 
thinkers of the Enlightenment. 
It must be stressed that Brentano did not intend his own ac-
count as an encompassing and complete description of the history 
of philosophy. His intention was, rather, to offer one type of ap-
proach to the history of philosophy in cogent fashion which 
would be useful in the evaluation of certain philosophical and 
 
8 This idea is present already in Brentano’s Vom Dasein Gottes, ed. A. 
Kastil, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1929, p. 86. English translation: On the Exist-
ence of God, Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987, p. 69. 
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historical claims. It is to provide the framework, above all, for 
the proper understanding of the process by which philosophical 
knowledge is gathered in the first phase, the phase of openness to 
scientific evidence. 
2. The Emergence of Brentano’s Theory 
Brentano dealt with the problem of the history of philosophy 
not only in the essay on this subject matter that is translated as an 
appendix below, but also in other, less well-known texts in which 
Brentano discusses this problem, texts which show that, while 
some elements in the theory of the four phases remained constant 
in his works, others went through changes. 
Brentano’s very first publication, on “The History of the Ec-
clesiastic Sciences”, appeared in 1867.9 There we find a periodi-
zation of the history of philosophy which is roughly the same as 
the one presented in “The Four Phases of Philosophy” of 1895. 
Similarly, in the introductory essay to his Lectures On the Histo-
ry of Greek Philosophy, Brentano sees the main characteristic of 
the history of philosophy as lying precisely in the fact that, after 
each period of development, there follows a period of decline.10 
Philosophy is seen as being contrasted to the other sciences in 
that it has a tendency to renounce its own previously established 
results. This process is not, however, irreversible. Given the req-
uisite development of culture, an insistence by some philosophers 
on the theoretical interest can bring philosophy back once more 
to its original form.11 
 
9 “Geschichte der kirchlichen Wissenschaften”, in Johann Adam Möhler’s 
Kirchengeschichte (The History of the Church), vol. 2, Regensburg, 1867. 
10 See Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand (ed.), Franz Brentano: Vorlesungen 
über die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (Lectures on the History of 
Greek Philosophy), Bern: Francke, 1963. 
11 Op. cit., p. 15. 
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The Influence of Comte  
Brentano’s idea of the four phases was undoubtedly influ-
enced by the French philosopher and historian of science, Au-
guste Comte (1798-1857). Comte held views very similar to 
those of Brentano, and the latter’s essay on Comte, published in 
1869, is of crucial importance with respect to Brentano’s theory. 
The most interesting part of this essay is a series of short state-
ments at the end of the text in which Brentano attempts to lay 
down the general rules that govern the history of philosophy.12 
According to this theory, each period in the history of philosophy 
is composed of only three phases. The first is marked again by 
the burgeoning of a purely scientific interest, the second by 
methodological clarification and new factual discoveries, and the 
third is marked by decline.  
Where in his later writings Brentano saw the prevailing prac-
tical attitude as a general reason for decline, here he borrows 
from Comte in seeing the decline which followed the rapid peri-
od of development in the Middle Ages as lying in the exaggerat-
ed concern with metaphysical subtleties on the part of the scho-
lastic philosophers.13 
In the collection of Brentano’s writings published under the 
title On the Existence of God we encounter once again a threefold 
schema.14 The period of flourishing coincides as before with the 
work of Aristotle. It is followed by a period of skepticism con-
 
12 As Brentano notes, this is the same theory he had already presented in 
his “History of the Ecclesiastic Sciences”, op. cit. 
13 See Section 3 of the translation below (pp. 85-87). Brentano holds 
moreover that his theory of phases can be grounded psychologically. What he 
means by this can be understood from a rather short statement in his Psychol-
ogy from the Empirical Standpoint. The history of mankind, he there writes, 
represents what can analogically be observed in the development of each indi-
vidual. See his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, op. cit., p. 53. 
English translation p. 42. 
14 Vom Dasein Gottes, op. cit., p. 86. English translation p. 69. 
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nected to the name of Pyrrho, and by a final period of what Bren-
tano calls the ‘mystical reaction’ in the form of neo-Platonism. 
Here again the mystical phase amounts to a complete disintegra-
tion of the fruitful philosophical interest that had been manifested 
earlier. Its speculative, subjectively determined products are 
hardly distinguishable from those of literature or art. Instead of 
scientific rigour, the authors of such products seek ‘popularity’. 
This schema is at first outlined by Brentano in the context of a 
discussion of Greek philosophy. But it is then applied in the same 
work to the philosophy of the Middle Ages and to nineteenth-
century German philosophy.  
Bear in mind that the schema of the phases is here presented 
in a context in which Brentano’s main objective is that of 
demonstrating the existence of God. It is teleology in both ani-
mate and inanimate nature which is taken by Brentano as the 
most important such demonstration,15 and teleology is also one of 
of the most important presuppositions in Brentano’s theory of the 
history of philosophy. As he writes in his introduction to On the 
Existence of God, philosophy in its full form is the most perfect 
accomplishment of religion and stands in service of the same 
divine plan that leads mankind in general to fulfillment.16 
Brentano was moreover convinced that he lived in a time 
in which religion would enter its higher form, that of phi-
losophy.17 This and other features of his gradually developing 
 
15 See his manuscript: “Zum Geleite: Aus einem Briefe F. Brentanos an 
einen Agnostiker” (Introduction: From a letter of Franz Brentano Addressed 
to an Agnostic), in Vom Dasein Gottes, p. LVII and especially pp. LVIII-LIX. 
English translation pp. 9 ff. 
16 Similar ideas are put forward by Brentano in his “Über die Gründe der 
Entmutigung auf philosophischem Gebiete” (On the Reasons for Discour-
agement in Philosophy), Vienna: Braumüller, 1874, reprinted in Über die 
Zukunft der Philosophie, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968; see also his “Ploti-
nus” of 1876 in Die Vier Phasen der Philosophie.  
17 He speaks of ‘universelle Revolution’ in Über die Zukunft der Philoso-
phie, p. 12. 
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theory of the history of philosophy are summarized in his lecture 
“On the Future of Philosophy”, a lecture delivered in 1893 (two 
years before the “Four Phases”), which contains all the major 
elements of the latter. Here again, a first flourishing phase is 
considered as preceding three remaining phases of decline. The 
latter are labeled dogmatism, critical scepticism, and a phase of 
‘absolute philosophies’ illustrated by the systems of German 
idealism.  
The reference to dogmatism here is new.18 We have seen that 
Brentano offers different possible explanations of what is re-
sponsible for initiating the first phase of decline: a transformation 
of the theoretical interest into a practical one, an exaggerated 
concern with metaphysical subtleties, the moment of ‘populariza-
tion’, and now: dogmatism. Although it might be possible to ar-
gue that these elements do not in fact exclude one another, or that 
they tell us the same thing in different ways, it seems clear that 
Brentano took some time to reach full clarity concerning these 
four aspects of his theory.  
Brentano’s Schema 
In the “Four Phases of Philosophy” we have Brentano’s full-
fledged version of the doctrine of the phases. The most important 
new element concerns his account of the nature of the history of 
philosophy when taken as a whole. He insists—as already men-
tioned—that the parallelism between philosophy and the natural 
sciences is only partial; philosophy shows one crucial similarity 
also to the history of the arts, namely the regular reappearance of 
phases of decline. The resultant final version of the theory of the 
four phases can be represented as follows:19 
 
18 Brentano mentions the period of dogmatism in his “Plotinus”.  
19 The original version of this chart was produced in Kasimir 
Twardowski’s “Franz Brentano and the History of Philosophy”, Przel-om 
(Vienna), 11, August 3, 1895. 
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Ancient Philosophy 
a) Flourishing Phase 1: The period from Thales to Aristotle 
b) Decline Phase 2: Stoicism and Epicureanism 
  Phase 3: New Academy, Pyrrhonism, Eclecticism 
  Phase 4: Neo-Pythagoreanism, neo-Platonism 
Medieval Philosophy 
a) Flourishing Phase 1: Latin Patristic and Scholastic Philosophy 
    (up to Thomas Aquinas) 
b) Decline Phase 2: Scotism  
  Phase 3: Nominalism (William of Ockham) 
  Phase 4: Mysticism, Lull, Nicholas of Cusa 
Modern Philosophy 
a) Flourishing Phase 1: Francis Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz 
b) Decline Phase 2: French and German Rationalism 
  Phase 3: David Hume, Thomas Reid 
  Phase 4: The philosophy of the Scottish School 
    after Hume, including Berkeley, Kant and 
    German Idealism. 
One constant element in each successive period is the 
phenomenon of decline. What Brentano calls mysticism or—
following Hegel—‘absolute’ philosophy, is another constant 
element. Brentano’s account of mysticism reveals that for him it 
is the method used which determines the nature of a given 
philosophy. Mysticism is a reaction to scepticism. It tries to 
reestablish the authority of theoretical knowledge. But in the 
absence of any unprejudiced and natural empirical method for 
coming to grips with reality as it exists outside of and 
independently of the subject, mysticism dramatizes the 
significance of the subjective side of knowledge and yields only 
idiosyncratic results of no scientific value. It turns to unnatural 
methods, such as ‘vision’ or ‘inspiration’, which make any 
falsification in principle impossible. Philosophy ceases to be a 
science, and it comes to an end as a serious human enterprise. 
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3. Factors Influencing Brentano’s Theory 
As we have already seen, one of the most important sources of 
of the Brentanian theory of the four phases was Auguste Comte. 
Comte was one of the best-known philosophical writers in Eu-
rope in the second half of the nineteenth century. He saw the 
history of philosophy as one part of a more general history of 
human thought, a history which falls into three main phases: 1. a 
‘theological’ phase which lasted until the end of the thirteenth 
century, in which the most developed expressions of human 
thinking were realized in a theological framework; 2. a meta-
physical phase, which lasted until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, in which philosophy played the same role as had former-
ly been adopted by theology; and 3. a ‘positive’ or scientific 
phase, which was initiated through the rapid development of the 
modern natural sciences and in which, in Comte’s eyes, the histo-
ry of mankind entered the period of its final fulfilment.  
The idea of the periodization of history is of course much old-
er than Comte.20 Yet we know that Comte’s emphasis on the 
‘positive’ or scientific phase in the history of mankind as far 
surpassing that of metaphysical or ‘speculative’ philosophy was 
especially important for the young Brentano. Brentano was influ-
enced also by Comte’s idea that the new phase in the history of 
mankind would coincide with a new, ‘spiritual’ form of religion 
 
20 Its origin lies in Christian historiography. Joachim a Fiore, to mention 
only one example, tried to reform the Roman Catholic Church in the thir-
teenth century by pointing out that the history of mankind can be divided into 
three phases. The first is that of the Old Testament or ‘the Father’; the second 
is that of the New Testament, or ‘Son’; and finally the third phase is that of 
the Holy Spirit, in which a new form of the old Christian religion was sup-
posed to be established, by Joachim himself. These ideas remained always 
just under the surface in the European philosophical tradition, so much so that 
both Hegel’s conception of history and Comte’s idea of the phases can be 
seen as having been derived from them. 
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which would succeed Christianity. The ‘positive religion’ which 
Comte himself founded still exists in France. On the other hand, 
as Brentano notes, Comte’s ‘positivism’ deals only with those 
features in the history of mankind which confirm tendencies to 
positive development or progress. 
The Periodization of the History of Philosophy:  
Kant and his Followers  
Brentano’s system must be seen as belonging to a period in 
Continental philosophy in which problems concerning the history 
of philosophy and its periodization played a central role in other 
quarters too. Important investigations were at this time being 
carried out by both French and German thinkers. The efforts of 
the former culminated in the work of Comte; as for the latter, the 
most influential product was the system created by Hegel in his 
various works on the philosophy of history.21 The idea that there 
are general or even evident laws that govern history in general as 
well as the history of philosophy was, to be sure, formulated by 
Hegel in an extremely radical fashion. But Hegel was not the first 
who tried to find some sort of ‘reason in history’. We find similar 
passages already in the chapter entitled ‘The History of Pure 
Reason’ in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant distin-
guishes between a purely historical approach to the origin of 
philosophical schools and a more sophisticated understanding 
entailing a methodological view of the history of philosophy.22 
This methodological view, Kant holds, would recognize three 
types of philosophy which reappear in regular fashion. The three 
types are, in succession, the dogmatic, the sceptic, and the criti-
cal. The main representative of the first, as Kant sees it, is Chris-
tian Wolff. The main representative of the second is Hume. Un-
 
21 See for instance Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.  
22 See B 880-884. 
 3. Factors Influencing Brentano’s Theory 19 
 
 
derstandably, Kant considers himself the main representative of 
the third, critical type of thinking. In another of his writings, 
Kant is even more explicit, asserting that ‘this chronological or-
der is grounded in the human faculty of knowledge.’23 
Note that Kant is not clear whether his stages are to be consid-
ered as a priori forms of the history of philosophy or as merely 
historical periods that can be recognized empirically. In German 
philosophy during the first half of the nineteenth century, when a 
rich variety of works were written on the ‘pure forms’ that gov-
ern the history of philosophy, views of the first type were domi-
nant. Such forms are held to be capable of being grasped in their 
essential nature without any investigation of the actual events of 
philosophical history. Thus Friedrich Ast argues in his Outline of 
the History of Philosophy of 1807 that the historian of philoso-
phy has to consider the facts of the history of philosophy as fac-
ets of a single ‘idea’. We find the same view in Johann Christian 
August Grohmann,24 in Fichte,25 in Schelling,26 and especially in 
Hegel. 
 
23 Immanuel Kant: “Welche sind die Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit 
Leibnizens und Wolff’s Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?” (What Progress 
Has Metaphysics Made Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolf in Germany?), 
Königsberg, 1804, in Werke (Akademie-Ausgabe), VII, p. 264. Also quoted 
by Lutz Geldsetzer, Die Philosophie der Philosophiegeschichte im 19. Jahr-
hundert (The Philosophy of the History of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury), Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1968. 
24 See his Über den Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie (On the Con-
cept of the History of Philosophy), Wittenberg, 1797. 
25 See the article “Übersicht des Vorzüglichsten, was für die Geschichte 
der Philosophie seit 1780 geleistet worden” (“Overview of the Most Im-
portant Contributions to the History of Philosophy since 1780”), published 
anonymously in Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft teutscher 
Gelehrten, 1795, vol. 4. Geldsetzer argues that this article was written by 
Fichte; see his Die Philosophie der Philosophiegeschichte im 19. Jahrhun-
dert, p. 27.  
26 F. Schelling, Abhandlung über die Frage ob eine Philosophie der Ge-
schichte möglich sei (Study of the Question Whether a History of Philosophy  
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As a succcessor to Kantian philosophy, only Hegel managed 
to create a school of younger philosophers who enthusiastically 
followed his ideas during the 1830s and 40s. By the end of the 
1840s however, even the followers of Hegel (and especially the 
so-called ‘Young Hegelians’) had abandoned the ideas of their 
master. The reasons for the defection of such radical thinkers as 
Ludwig Feuerbach, a relentless critic of religion in general and of 
Christianity in particular, as well as Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels, were both political and philosophical. Politically, neo-
Hegelian radicalism was suppressed along with the revolutions in 
European cities in the late 1840s with which it was associated. 
Philosophically, the rapid development of the natural sciences led 
to the failure of Hegelianism not least in virtue of its logical 
defects and of its lack of empirical foundations.  
The collapse of Hegelianism in Germany meant also that the 
history of philosophy came to be considered in a new way. A 
kind of radical turn was carried out by historians of philosophy, 
who now understood their task in terms of scientific research and 
reflection rather than in terms of the permutation of speculative 
constructions. The first of these scholars was Christian August 
Brandi,27 who was followed, and overshadowed, by the most 
famous, empirically oriented, historians of philosophy in German 
scholarship in the nineteenth century:28 Friedrich Ueberweg 
 
is Possible), 1798. 
27 Von dem Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie. Eine Ein-
ladungsschrift zu seinen an der Universität Berlin zu haltenden Vorlesungen 
(On the Concept of the History of Philosophy. Invitation to the Author’s Lec-
tures at the University of Berlin), Copenhagen, 1815. 
28 The protestant German philosopher and theologian Friedrich Ernst Dan-
iel Schleiermacher (1768-1834) is another interesting representative of the 
new, empirically oriented, trend. Schleiermacher attempted to ground the 
scientific investigation of historical facts of philosophy on the investigation of 
the special circumstances of the age, language, and the biography of the 
thinkers involved. Written and spoken words and propositions are to be inter-
preted on two grounds, both of which are indispensable; Schleiermacher  
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(1826-1871)29 and Eduard Zeller (1814 -1908).30 Each of these 
thinkers investigated the facts of the history of philosophy empir-
ically and systematically. Through their work, the influence of 
the idealist interpretation of Kantian philosophy came to an end. 
As we shall see, Brentano combined the new, empirical approach 
to history with the original Kantian thesis to the effect that there 
are rules which govern the history of philosophy. 
The ‘Catholic Principle’ 
Franz Brentano was not only a fervent prophet of scientific 
philosophy but also a Catholic priest. From our present point of 
view, therefore, it is important to consider those nineteenth-
century works in our field which had their theoretical basis in 
Catholicism, for this involved a new sort of principle for the 
evaluation of developments in philosophy. According to the 
Catholic Church, Cartesian and post-Cartesian philosophy repre-
sented a deviation from that sound tradition of the Church which 
amounts to the adherence to the Aristotelian-Scholastic doctrines 
formulated by a chain of thinkers from Thomas Aquinas to Fran-
cesco Suarez. Kantian philosophy and German idealism as a 
whole were seen by the representatives of this Catholic philoso-
 
called the first ‘divinatory’ and meant by that a kind of empathy with the 
author; the second is that of grammatical and historical-cultural understand-
ing. The latter cannot lead to a proper understanding of a given text without 
the former. Schleiermacher called his method of understanding ‘hermeneu-
tics’ and became thereby the founder of a philosophical school which still 
exists today.  
29 Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Thales bis auf die 
Gegenwart (Outline of the History of Philosophy from Thales to our Time), 
1863. 
30 See his “Die Geschichte der alten Philosophie in den letztverflossenen 
50 Jahren” (“The History of Philosophy During the Last 50 Years”), in Jahr-
bücher der Gegenwart, 1843. 
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phia perennis as having staged a revolt against the traditional 
doctrines and conceptions of authentic philosophy.  
Among the historians of philosophy in Germany who based 
their interpretation precisely on this Catholic conception, C. J. M. 
M. Windischmann in his Critical Considerations on the Fate of 
Philosophy in Modern Times, and on the Beginning of a New 
Age in Philosophy insisted that modern philosophy in general, 
and German idealism in particular, was nothing other than a col-
lection of false beliefs.31 Windischmann saw the philosophy of 
his day as amounting not merely to a period of decline in the 
history of philosophy, but to the very destruction of genuine 
philosophical values. Modern philosophy thus coincides with 
secularism, in Windischmann’s view, and his ‘Catholic principle’ 
remained characteristic of a group of philosophers who were 
more or less associated with the Catholic Church—among whom 
we find Brentano’s teacher Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg as 
well as Franz Brentano himself. 
Trendelenburg was responsible not only for the renewal of in-
terest in Aristotle’s philosophy on the part of the German philos-
ophers of his day, but also for bringing about an almost unani-
mous rejection of Hegelian philosophy from the late 1840s on-
wards. As Trendelenburg argued, the main flaw in Hegel’s phi-
losophy was his rejection of the idea of an autonomous reality as 
something different from the sphere of thinking. Trendelenburg’s 
emphasis on the notion of teleology and his ardently religious 
convictions as well as his radical rejection of Hegel had a great 
impact on the young Brentano, and indeed on Trendelenburg’s 
other students, among whom we find Wilhelm Dilthey, Søren 
Kierkegaard, and even Karl Marx.32 Trendelenburg’s personality 
 
31 Kritische Betrachtungen über die Schicksale der Philosophie in der 
neueren Zeit und den Eintritt einer neuen Epoche in derselben (Critical Inves-
tigations Concerning the Fate of Philosophy in Our Time, and the Beginning 
of a New Age Therein), 1825. 
32 In addition to Comte, there are also other French thinkers whose ideas  
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and thought was of crucial importance in Brentano’s spiritual 
development33 (Brentano described himself, seemingly literally, 
as Aristotle’s ‘most favored son’). It was due to Trendelenburg’s 
influence that Aristotle became so important in Brentano’s phi-
losophy. 
Brentano’s conception of the four phases is thus clearly a 
product of his age. It was influenced by the Kantian conception 
of the three forms of philosophy and by the efforts of those who 
tried to replace the Kantian theory of ideal forms with the results 
of scientific investigation. Brentano shares with Kant the view 
that dogmatism and scepticism represent an imperfect state in the 
history of philosophy. They agree, too, that scepticism is a reac-
tion to dogmatism—and in both accounts it is just such a reaction 
which lends to philosophy its dynamic aspect. With this, howev-
 
show a striking similarity with those of Brentano. Thus J. M. De Gérando, in 
a work published in 1809, offers a periodicization of the history of philosophy 
into five historical stages: 1. In the first, one tries to find the principles of 
reality in the nature of things. 2. In the second, the nature of the human mind 
is studied in a philosophical way. 3. In the third, illumination and ecstatic 
states of mind become important, and philosophy becomes the servant of 
religion. This is the period of mysticism and contemplative philosophies. 4. 
The fourth period is dominated by logical axioms. Instead of careful investi-
gations, we have systems of propositions that are built up in a strictly logical 
manner. 5. In the fifth period, the main field of research is again the human 
mind, but from a different point of view: its processes and laws are studied 
with the method of the natural sciences; all the results of the previous stages 
are here summarized and recapitulated. Beside De Gérando’s cyclic under-
standing of history, one can also mention Victor Cousin and Charles Renou-
vier. Both attempted to work out a system of periods in the history of philoso-
phy, with the very important difference, however, that, instead of ‘phases’, 
they spoke of ‘types’.  
33 Brentano was a student of Trendelenburg in Berlin in 1858–1859. He 
enthusiastically followed Trendelenburg’s courses on Aristotle and shared his 
teacher’s views on the desolate situation of contemporary philosophy. For 
more details concerning the relationship between Brentano and Trendelen-
burg, see Josef M. Werle, Franz Brentano und die Zukunft der Philosophie, 
Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1989, pp. 64 ff. 
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er, their agreement comes to an end. For Kant, the imperfect 
states of dogmatism and scepticism are corrected and fulfilled by 
the critical philosophy, i.e. by Kant’s own system. For Brentano, 
as will by now be clear, the pattern is changed in that the fruitful, 
flourishing state of philosophy is represented in each cycle by a 
new primary phase (that of Aristotle, Scholasticism, etc.); the 
stages of dogmatism and scepticism represent declining periods 
in Brentano’s eyes, as indeed does the phase of Kantian critical 
philosophy itself.  
4. Problems in the Brentanian Theory 
Brentano’s “Four Phases of Philosophy” caused a great deal 
of controversy upon its publication, not least because, like some 
of his other writings, it raises a highly intriguing proposal with-
out confronting certain stunning difficulties. This somewhat per-
plexing trait which was characteristic of Brentano also in other 
spheres 
of his life—may have been one reason why he himself did not 
care to publish many of the works which were already completed 
during his lifetime.34  
 
34 Besides his doctoral dissertation and his Habilitationsschrift on Aristotle 
Brentano published only two books of greater importance. The first was his 
Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt (1874), and the other was his rather 
short work on ethics (Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, 1889). Some of his 
lectures were published in booklet-form, and he published articles, mainly on 
current problems in philosophy and in education. But he never published for 
example the second volume of his Psychologie. Instead, he published an en-
larged version of one of the chapters of his Psychologie under the title Von 
der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene, Leipzig: Duncker and Hum-
blot, 1911). In his later years, Brentano accounted for this rather small number 
of publications by referring to the difficulties of proofreading (caused by his 
increasing blindness). (Cf. Werle, op. cit., p. 46.) Brentano’s other works, 
lectures and papers were in part collected and edited by his disciples, Alfred 
Kastil and Oskar Kraus, and later by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand. Many of 
his works are still available only in manuscript form. 
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Thus in her Introduction to The Four Phases of Philosophy, 
Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand mentions that Brentano’s idea of 
recurring historical cycles was considered by many as untenable 
or at least strange. We read for instance in Wilhelm Windel-
band’s History of Philosophy of 1907 that Brentano’s attempt, 
however close it stands to Comte’s theory of phases, was a 
‘complete failure’.35 Windelband does not further justify this 
statement, yet it is not difficult to see the sorts of problems which 
he, as one of the foremost experts in the history of philosophy in 
his day, might have had with the Brentanian thesis.  
Such problems might be summarized in a thesis to the effect 
that Brentano’s doctrine of the four phases amounts to a crass 
oversimplification of the history of philosophy. Thus he assigns 
the ‘rapidly progressing phase’ in Greek philosophy to an age 
when various competing philosophical schools already existed 
and when even philosophers who are considered by Brentano as 
belonging to a phase of decline contributed to the positive devel-
opment. Aristotle could not have worked out his philosophy 
without Plato. Yet, Plato is not even mentioned by Brentano in 
most of his descriptions of the schema, since Plato’s personality, 
philosophical doctrines and the tradition originating with him 
would have disturbed the consistency of Brentano’s theory. One 
could mention, too, that what Brentano calls ‘mysticism’ was 
present already in the first phase of classical Greek philosophy in 
the work of the Pythagoreans. Even if one can argue that, for 
example, by the time of Middle Platonism mystical elements had 
become more conspicuous than at any previous time, still it is 
clear that many of the early Pythagorean or Eleatic ideas do not 
fit well with Brentano’s picture.  
Such problems are raised also by Brentano’s interpreters. Hu-
go Bergmann’s article of 1965 became notorious for its claim 
that ‘this alleged law [of the four phases] had devastating conse-
 
35 Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Tübingen, 1907, p. 10. 
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quences for Brentano’s school.’36 Bergmann’s criticism is 
grounded on the undeniable fact that the Brentanian schema 
seems not to apply to very many particular cases. Thus Berg-
mann rightly refuses to accept that the whole of post-Aristotelian 
philosophy until the end of neo-Platonism could be considered en 
en bloc as a decline. Bergmann notes in particular that in Brenta-
no’s Lectures on the History of Greek Philosophy the Pythagore-
ans are assigned a place very late in the course of historical de-
velopment: after the Sophists, after Socrates, and just before Pla-
to. Bergmann mentions other difficulties too. But his conclusion 
goes beyond any summary of particular problems. According to 
Bergmann’s final judgement, the most ‘devastating consequence’ 
of the Brentanian theory was that its application to the history of 
philosophy from Kant onwards made impossible any authentic 
‘dialogue’ between Brentano’s school and the non-Brentanian 
philosophers of the nineteenth century.37  
Eliam Campos argues in a similar way in his Brentano’s Crit-
icism of Kant.38 Campos, too, mentions the factual inaccuracy of 
many of Brentano’s statements, especially those which deal with 
the Sophists and with philosophical works belonging to the third 
declining periods, as completely without value and to be con-
demned outright. And one could cite also critical remarks regard-
ing this matter on the part of authors like Etienne Gilson39 or 
Wolfgang Stegmüller.40  
 
36 See his article “Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy”, Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research, 26/1, 1965. Franziska Mayer-Hille-
brand quotes this sentence in her Introduction to the Felix Meiner edition of 
the Vier Phasen, pp. IX-X. 
37 Bergmann, op. cit., p. 96. 
38 Die Kantkritik Brentanos (Brentano’s Criticism of Kant), Bonn: Bouvi-
er Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1979. 
39 See his “Franz Brentano’s Interpretation of Mediaeval Philosophy”, 
Medieval Studies, 1, 1939.  
40 Stegmüller is among the few who presented a detailed criticism of Bren-
tano’s philosophy, allowing himself to be misled either by Brentano’s enthu- 
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How, then, can we maintain our view of the theoretical im-
portance of the Brentanian schema? 
 
siastic followers, or by those critics who—like Bergmann—seem not to be 
able to grasp what is undeniably valuable in the Brentanian schema. See the 
introductory section on Brentano in Wolfgang Stegmüller’s Hauptströmungen 
der Gegenwartsphilosophie, vol. I, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1989. 
English translation as: Main Currents in Contemporary German, British 
and American Philosophy, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970. 
5. How to Read Brentano 
There are some who have evaluated Brentano’s theory in a 
more sympathetic way. In Lutz Geldsetzer’s book Brentano is 
viewed as part of a wider discussion on the history of philosophy 
in nineteenth-century Germany, and in fact many of Brentano’s 
statements cannot be understood without taking into considera-
tion the various trends in the historiography of philosophy to 
which Geldsetzer refers. Thus, Geldsetzer points out that the 
main reason why Brentano’s conception of the history of philos-
ophy found little positive echo in his time was the then prevailing 
view to the effect that history as such, and the history of philoso-
phy in particular, must be considered in terms of a perpetual 
positive development. This progressivist view originated in 
Kant’s criticism of the metaphysics of his day, as well as in He-
gel’s idea of the predetermined character of history, but it was 
reinforced by the more general, and more plausible, view of the 
continuous progress of the natural sciences. 
Geldsetzer would have us understand Brentano’s theory as a 
part of the Romantic movement which opposed the ideal of de-
velopment by substituting the notion of decadence or decline. 
Geldsetzer has a point, but only to the degree that Romantic 
views are in harmony with Catholicism in emphasizing the falsity 
of modern values. However, Brentano should be seen as embrac-
ing not Romanticism as such but above all the ‘Catholic princi-
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ple’. He is at the same time someone who is convinced that the 
theoretical sciences, including philosophy itself, are tending to-
wards an ultimate fulfillment which will at the same time consti-
tute a happy future for mankind. This teleological motif in Bren-
tano’s theory is incontrovertible; yet it is equally important to see 
that his main concern was to find an equilibrium between teleo-
logical optimism on the one hand and cultural decadence on the 
other. Brentano emphasized at one and the same time both the 
importance of the Verfallszeiten (the declining periods in the 
history of philosophy) and the thesis that the history of philoso-
phy as a whole displays a continuous development (in the sense 
that each ascending phase attains a level somewhat higher than 
its predecessor). 
Geldsetzer’s approach nevertheless offers more help in gain-
ing access to the core of the Brentanian theory than do most writ-
ings on this matter. Certainly one can acknowledge the superfici-
ality of Brentano’s treatment of particular cases, and Mayer-
Hillebrand is right when she emphasizes that Brentano’s primary 
goal was not that of detailed accuracy, but rather that of formu-
lating a general law.41 Bergmann’s talk about ‘devastating conse-
quences’, does not in fact cancel the validity of the theory itself, 
especially if this theory is considered not as a first-order descrip-
tion of the historical facts but rather as a heuristic method by 
which one can throw new light on facts too long familiar. 
Paul Weingartner mentions in his “Introduction” to the collec-
tion of Brentano’s essays entitled On the Future of Philosophy42 
that already the fact that Brentano had the courage to oppose 
most of the popular philosophies of his day is itself of merit. Hu-
go Bergmann’s thesis—that the standpoint propounded in the 
“Four Phases” prevented dialogue with the proponents of other 
conceptions of philosophy—seems to be too weak to undermine 
 
41 See her Introduction to Brentano’s Die vier Phasen der Philosophie, p. 
XI. 
42 Über die Zukunft der Philosophie, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968. 
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Brentano’s theory. Bergmann writes as if dialogue were an es-
sential factor in building up a philosophical system and as if im-
portant thinkers, such as Kant or Wittgenstein, had shown greater 
willingness to discuss their own special problems with represent-
atives of rival philosophies. Moreover, Brentano was clearly not 
a dilettante in philosophical matters. He was a leading expert in 
many fields of the history of philosophy, including Aristotle and 
Scholasticism, as well as a primary figure in the history of such 
disciplines as psychology and ethics. One should not forget, ei-
ther, that it is remarkable how many of the problems and positive 
solutions in phenomenology and analytic philosophy in our own 
day were raised for the first time by Brentano.43 One should add, 
too, that some of the concerns central to modern cognitive sci-
ence, above all the concept of intentionality, originate in Brenta-
no’s work.44 
 
43 See Klaus Hedwig’s Introduction to Brentano’s Geschichte der mit-
telalterlichen Philosophie, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1980, p. IX. See also 
Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano, Chicago 
and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1994.  
44 John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 
1982; see also M. Davis and G. W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness, Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 1993.  
6. Ideal Types: The Theory Behind the Schema 
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Josef M. Werle has argued that “the Brentanian conception of 
the history of philosophy is an ideal type model of explanation 
with all the strengths and weaknesses which go together there-
with.”45 The concept of the ‘ideal type’ as a technical term was 
created by the sociologist Max Weber. According to Weber, the 
ideal type of a sociological or historical phenomenon is that 
structure which the given phenomenon would possess in a situa-
tion which was, counterfactually, exempt from external or alien 
factors and influences. In reality, of course, such a situation is 
never realized, yet in Weber’s eyes the understanding of such 
phenomena must always involve some form of ideal type on the 
basis of which description, analysis and classification become 
possible.  
The ideal type, as Weber formulates it in his Economy and 
Society,46 is a methodological and auxiliary concept. Thus, to 
work with ideal types in a description is to use a form of explana-
tion which may be termed ‘ideal type explanation’. Its essential 
function is not to describe a group of phenomena, but rather to 
offer a conceptual means for understanding, for cutting through 
the detail. An ideal type is never realized in concrete circum-
stances; it is, precisely, ‘ideal’ and should be judged on this ba-
sis.  
If, now, we consider Brentano’s schema as one applying the 
Weberian ideal type explanation, then we can resolve the puzzle 
as to whether the phases in the Brentanian schema are to be con-
sidered as the result of a strictly historical inquiry or as yielded 
by a deductive method based on some a priori principle. In fact, 
according to the ideal type explanation, the Brentanian concep-
tion is neither merely empirical nor a priori. It is designed to tell 
us something about the nature of philosophy as projected on a 
 
45 Werle, Franz Brentano und die Zukunft der Philosophie, p. 91. 
46 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden 
Soziologie, Tübingen, 1922. English translation as: Economy and Society: An 
Outline of Interpretive Sociology, New York: Bedminster Press, 1968. 
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historical scale, but it concerns historical processes only in the 
form these processes would take if no external elements were to 
influence them. Since there is a complex mass of external influ-
ences that make it difficult to grasp the structure of the historical 
process in any pure form, the ideal type serves as an aid to orien-
tation with respect to certain crucial general features of the 
course of historical development. 
‘Decline’ in the History of Philosophy 
According to Brentano, the history of philosophy should not 
be seen as a contingent manifold of idiosyncratic ‘systems’, but 
rather as a process which has its own typical regularities. The 
first of these regularities is based on the rather plausible assump-
tion that the ‘history of philosophy’, or the history of some given 
branches in the history of philosophy, will be composed of phas-
es in which a certain orientation and method, certain types of 
subject-matter, and a certain style in exposing philosophical ideas 
will be recognized as typical. Secondly, it is similarly plausible 
to assume that such phases in the history of philosophy will stand 
to each other in an interactive relationship, a relationship in 
which the connections between the particular phases are also 
coordinated by typical regularities. For the Enlightenment think-
ers, the most important typical characteristic of the history of 
philosophy is what they saw as its irresistible development to-
wards a happy fulfillment. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the 
history of philosophy is one of irresistible decline.  
Brentano, as already seen, did not lack the conception of a re-
curring development of philosophy. He held that periods of de-
cline are in many cases followed by periods of renewal of the 
genuine philosophical interest. He considered, for instance, the 
collapse of Hegelianism and the rise of empirical methods in the 
historical sciences and in psychology as forming on such junc-
ture of decline and renewal. At the same time, he was convinced 
that in the distant future a unified science will lead, under the 
auspices of a renewed philosophy, to the goals formulated origi-
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nally by Christianity: that is, to some form of a final fulfillment 
of mankind.  
Still, in Brentano’s schema of the four phases, the main em-
phasis is not on the future renewal of philosophy, but rather on 
‘decline’. Brentano lived after all in a time when the witches’ 
brew of visionary ideas concerning the future of science and phi-
losophy, ideas which originated mainly in idealistic philosophy, 
was still influential. As we saw, Brentano opposed Kantianism in 
many ways. He saw it as the main enemy of the newly emerging 
empirical method in philosophy. It is mainly because of the 
widespread popularity of philosophies of Kantian origin that 
Brentano emphasized the fact that there are declining periods in 
the history of philosophy. 
The second salient feature in the Brentanian theory concerns 
the relationship between the successive individual phases in the 
history of philosophy. As Brentano remarks, one prevailing un-
derstanding sees the development of philosophy as proceeding in 
every case through a process of reaction to previous phases. For 
Brentano, however, the game of challenge and answer is charac-
teristic only of the periods of decline. Philosophy in its primeval 
form is neither based on the criticism of other philosophical theo-
ries, nor is it subject to such criticism. Certainly it would be dif-
ficult to find any philosophical theory or system that does not in 
some way react to earlier developments and is itself not subject 
to the challenges of critics. However, Brentano’s point is that the 
criticism of other philosophies is not an essential constituent of 
philosophy in its original form. Rivalry begins, rather, when phi-
losophy has already lost its original, pristine status so that it has 
become crucial to successive philosophical theories that they are 
justified and defended through the criticism of other theories.  
Another general feature of Brentano’s schema is the role of 
what he calls the ‘theoretical attitude’. Already in “The Four 
Phases of Philosophy” we find that one of the conditions which 
make sound philosophy possible is ‘a lively and pure theoretical 
interest’, and in many of Brentano’s other writings, too, for ex-
ample in his Lectures on the History of Greek Philosophy, we 
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find similar statements.47 ‘Theoretical interest’, for Brentano, 
means, first of all, an openness to nature, to natural facts and 
laws. It also means an attitude which makes the cognitive subject 
able to order and to systematize knowledge of empirical particu-
lars with insights concerning general laws, in such a way as to 
establish that sort of systematic whole we call science.48 
One further general feature captured in the Brentanian schema 
concerns the methods employed by philosophers at different 
stages in the developmental cycle. Indeed, Brentano’s theory as a 
whole can be understood as a thesis on the methodology of phi-
losophy that is formulated in the context of the history of philos-
ophy. For what eminently characterizes philosophy in its original 
form, as Brentano sees it, is precisely its ‘scientific method’. The 
scientific method, however, is a natural outcome of the theoreti-
cal attitude. According to Brentano, if we possess the theoretical 
attitude, then we are in principle capable of recognizing and ap-
plying the scientific method. On the other hand, our capability of 
acquiring the theoretical attitude is in many ways determined by 
the prevalent structures of the given phase of philosophy in 
which we work. In the phases of decline, it is obviously more 
difficult to recognize and apply the pristine method of philoso-
phy than it is in the first phase of development. The determinism 
expressed in the Brentanian schema is thus not absolute; accord-
ing to Brentano, just as we are always free to recognize and 
choose the right attitude in our moral life, so are we capable of 
finding the right way in our philosophy as well.49  
All in all, the general structure of decline seems to be the 
strongest characteristic of the Brentanian schema. Still, since the 
fate of philosophy, in Brentano’s view, is closely connected to 
 
47 Op. cit., p.7. 
48 Werle too emphasizes the importance of the theoretical attitude in Bren-
tano’s schema. See Werle, op. cit., p. 52. 
49 Franz Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, Leipzig: Felix 
Meiner, 1934, Paragraph 31.  
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the method we apply, it is worth considering Brentano’s own 
philosophical method in detail.  
Brentano’s Empiricism and the Method of Philosophy 
Brentano describes his own philosophical methodology as 
‘empirical’, and this is the expression he uses in the title of his 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Empiricism he sees as 
one of the most important features of a sound philosophical 
method. What he means by this is not that empirical facts, con-
sidered in themselves, are decisive in solving philosophical prob-
lems. Rather, he means that in order to reach philosophical re-
sults one must be open to the rich variety of empirical facts, and 
that without this attitude of openness it is impossible to remain 
faithful to reality. Reality, however, is not merely the totality of 
‘sensations’ and ‘ideas’ as it was for the British empiricists. In-
deed, Brentano rejected the starting point of traditional sensation-
oriented empiricism as being too narrow. 
A factor that makes Brentano’s empiricism distinctive turns 
on his use of what Roderick Chisholm, applying an expression of 
W. E. Johnson, termed ‘intuitive induction’. As Chisholm writes, 
referring to a footnote in Brentano’s On the Origin of Our 
Knowledge of Right and Wrong: 
In describing how we come to know, for example, that knowledge 
as such is worthy of love, [Brentano] says that when we appre-
hend ourselves as correctly loving a given act of knowledge, the 
goodness of all acts of knowing ‘becomes obvious at a single 
stroke, so to speak, and without induction from a particular 
case’50. ... It is ‘induction’ because it does proceed from a particu-
 
50 Franz Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, op. cit., footnote 
33. 
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lar case, but ‘intuitive’ since its conclusion is not ‘problematic’, 
but is necessary or, as Brentano would put it, ‘apodictic’.51 
Brentano gives a much more detailed account of the same 
phenomenon in the introduction to his Lectures on the History of 
Greek Philosophy.52 Here he offers a complex definition of 
knowledge according to which knowledge in the proper sense of 
the word is knowledge of necessity.53 We can know the necessity 
of something in either of two senses. First, in the sense that we 
know that there necessarily is something—as for example in the 
case of a particular perception (that the perception implies as a 
matter of necessity that there is something which is its content). 
Second, in the sense that we know necessarily the reason why 
there is something—as when we reflect on the cognitive and 
logical conditions which explain a particular perception. 
Knowledge of the second sort is of a higher quality than the first; 
it is knowledge in the proper sense of the word. Brentano uses 
the expression ‘insight’ (Einsicht), or ‘insight into the very rea-
son of something’, of the sort which we enjoy, for example, 
when we find a perspicuous geometrical proof.54 
Note however that, for Brentano, insight takes place always in 
a specific context of particular contents of sense-perception. 
Even if necessary and general laws are discovered through in-
sight, these laws are in every case exemplified in some empirical 
context, and they do not belong, as in Kant for instance, to a spe-
cial a priori realm. What makes Brentano an empiricist is not so 
much his understanding of how knowledge is acquired as his 
insistence that there is no subjective a priori sphere through 
 
51 See Roderick Chisholm, “Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology”, in Akten 
des XVI. internationalen Kongresses der Philosophie, Vienna, 1968. 
52 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, op. cit., 
p. 13. 
53 Op. cit., pp. 4 -6. 
54 ‘Einsicht aus dem Grunde’, op. cit., p. 5. 
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which, or by virtue of the epistemological priority of which, 
knowledge would be gained. 
Returning now to the problem of the history of philosophy, 
we can better understand Brentano’s history of phases as being 
also a history of the methods applied in each phase. The genuine 
method of philosophy, the method of ‘intuitive induction’ or 
‘insight’ is found only in the first phase, the phase of flourishing. 
In the subsequent phases we witness a gradual disappearance of 
the genuine method. ‘Insight’ is replaced first by mere rational 
argumentation, which lacks genuine insight into ‘the very reason 
of something’ and is shorn of its reference to reality. This degra-
dation of the genuine philosophical method leads, via skepticism, 
to the prevalence of procedures which justify themselves by ref-
erence to ‘mystical powers’.  
Thus, we have a fairly full picture of Brentano’s theory of the 
phases. The theory is dependent on many views which were pre-
dominant in Brentano’s day. Yet it has a peculiar characteristic 
which is its emphasis on the fact of decline in the history of phi-
losophy. Even if there are many problematic facets of Brentano’s 
theory, still, we have also seen that it is possible to view it in a 
more favorable light. It is possible, in other words, to consider 
his theory as an ideal type explanation which serves as a method-
ical tool in understanding the coherence of various developments 
in certain branches of the history of philosophy, branches which 
would otherwise appear rather disconnected.  
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37 
PART TWO: BRENTANO’S THEORY APPLIED 
1. The Four Phases of Post-Brentanian Philosophy 
We shall now try to show how, and to what measure, it is pos-
sible to apply Brentano’s ideal type explanation to the history of 
philosophy in the period after Brentano himself. 
The first problem we face in this context is the following. As 
is clear from what we have said of Brentano’s theory, the first 
period (from Thales to Plotinus and his followers) lasted about 
800 years. The second period (from Augustine, or from early 
Scholasticism, to late-Medieval mysticism) endured for more 
than 600 years. The third period (from Francis Bacon to German 
Idealism) took some 300 years to unfold itself from initial flour-
ishing to ultimate collapse. Can we then speak of a ‘period’ in 
the history of philosophy, after Brentano, that is in less than one 
century? Is it possible to make out all four phases in such a short 
period? 
As to the first question, it seems that it is not the length of a 
given period which is decisive in Brentano’s eyes. Rather, it is 
the historical structure which constitutes a period, the structure 
of one flourishing phase followed by three declining phases. As 
we shall see, such a structure can be found in the history of phi-
losophy after Brentano. 
As to the second question, it is easy to see that in each period 
of the Brentanian schema, the lengths of the phases vary from 
some 300 hundred years (from the Milesian School up to the 
death of Aristotle) to phases which are present almost simultane-
ously (Scotism and Ockhamism in the thirteenth century; Hume 
and Reid were near-contemporaries of Kant). That is, the 
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Brentanian phase-structure can be recognized even in a relatively 
short period, perhaps even in a single century.  
The second difficulty concerns the complex character of the 
history of philosophy since Brentano. For in using this phrase we 
may be referring either to Anglo-American analytic philosophy 
or to recent Continental traditions. A quick survey of the differ-
ences between Continental and Anglo-American philosophy 
shows however that, for all their interdependence at various 
points, we cannot consider these traditions as parts of any unified 
whole.  
Anglo-American Philosophy 
Moreover, given the above definition of a ‘period’, the history 
of Anglo-American analytic philosophy cannot be considered as 
constituting a closed period in the Brentanian sense. Even if 
there are some signs on the basis of which we might surmise that 
the Brentanian schema will soon be recognizable as a whole in 
Anglo-American analytic philosophy, we are not yet at the point 
of being able to determine exactly those developments which 
might constitute this schema. Bertrand Russell already saw evi-
dence of decline in the later Wittgensteinian philosophy and 
Georg Henrik von Wright rightly notes that analytic philosophy 
has in the last two decades lost its clear form and has become 
eclectic.55 Von Wright argues, moreover, that analytic philoso-
phy must be considered as a typical product of the twentieth cen-
tury, and that it has reached a point at which only an encompass-
ing new theory of philosophy can show the way for further de-
velopments.56 We can indeed see that recent analytic philosophy 
 
55 Georg Henrik von Wright, “Analytic Philosophy”, in M. Georg and 
Ulla Wessels (eds.), ANALYOMEN I. Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy, 
Berlin: De Gruyter, 1993. 
56 The notion that a new, encompassing philosophical (or scientific) theory 
is needed can also be found in such authors as Thomas Nagel, Hector-Neri 
Castañeda, Roger Penrose and some of the representatives of analytic philos- 
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is marked by a number of the features pointed to by Brentano as 
features of decline, above all a practical orientation, exemplified 
in the new predominance of forms of American pragmatism and 
in the explosive growth of the various branches of applied phi-
losophy. Many analytic philosophers are, moreover, adopting 
ideas borrowed from Continental philosophy as in the case of 
Donald Davidson or Richard Rorty, or they are seeking an en-
compassing theory of human consciousness by analyzing and 
evaluating the results of the cognitive sciences, as is manifest 
from the works of John Searle. In fact it seems that the publica-
tion of works on the problem of consciousness, and especially 
self-consciousness, from the late 1960s onwards by such authors 
as Roderick Chisholm, Hector-Neri Castañeda or Elizabeth 
Anscombe, has opened a new period in Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy in which philosophy cooperates closely with empiri-
cal science, with the cognitive sciences in particular, and in 
which traditional philosophical questions have been formulated 
in a new and scientific fashion.57 These are not obvious symp-
toms of decline, and thus only future developments will show the 
extent to which the four phase schema can in fact be applied to 
the recent history of Anglo-American analytic philosophy. 
Continental Philosophy 
Continental philosophy, on the other hand, seems to be much 
closer to constituting a closed period in the Brentanian sense. A 
sign of this is seen in the fact that the dominant philosophies on 
the Continent—phenomenology, hermeneutics, ‘post-structur-
alism’, ‘deconstructionism’, ‘postmodernism’ and so on—seem 
to have lost contact with recent developments in natural sciences, 
and some of them have abandoned entirely any scientific concep-
 
ophy of religion, such as Richard Swinburne. 
57 See for instance the Introduction to M. Davies and G. W. Humphreys 
(eds.), Consciousness, op. cit. 
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tion of philosophy. As Manfred Frank suggests, contemporary 
Continental philosophy is not capable of producing new philo-
sophical theories which might influence or determine the devel-
opment of the empirical sciences.58 Even such philosophical av-
enues as the theory of communicative discourse of Jürgen Ha-
bermas or Karl-Otto Apel—which have proven to be quite influ-
ential in certain circles even in English-speaking countries—
have not, in the end, shown themselves capable of breaking out 
of the circle of a kind of new hermeneutics. Moreover, the work 
of Habermas et al. belongs rather to the field of the social sci-
ences than to the realm of philosophy as traditionally conceived.  
Yet even those writers in Continental philosophy who would 
advance themselves as the legitimate heirs of traditional philo-
sophical problems—such as Emmanuel Levinas or Jacques Der-
rida—make use of a style and vocabulary in their writings which 
demonstrates that they have entirely abandoned the aspiration, 
characteristic of philosophy in the past, to theoretical relevance. 
What they offer, rather, is a kind of intellectual literature. That 
is, they attempt to establish a new literary genre, a development 
of the modern tradition of literary fiction, in which fragments of 
gnomic philosophy, story-telling, literary analysis, mystical poet-
ry, gossip and entertaining talk is roughly synthesized into an 
eclectic whole. This form of Continental philosophy, which likes 
so much to declare in rousing tones that we have reached the 
‘end of philosophy’, has certainly no direct relevance to scientific 
investigations.59  
Recent Continental philosophy exemplifies very well the 
Brentanian schema; that is, it manifests all the four phases of 
philosophy. By demonstrating this, we shall show that the appli-
 
58 See his introduction to Manfred Frank (ed.), Analytische Theorien des 
Selbstbewußtseins, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1994. 
59 Barry Smith, “The New European Philosophy”, in Barry Smith (ed.), 
Philosophy and Political Change in Eastern Europe, La Salle: The Hegeler 
Institute, 1993, 165-170 and 191-192. 
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cation of the Brentanian ideal type explanation to new sorts of 
cases is in principle possible. We shall try to analyze recent de-
velopments within Continental philosophy, bearing in mind that 
it was Brentano himself who stood at the beginning of these de-
velopments. We are, of course, aware of the fact that Brentano 
did not consider himself to be the first in a new, flourishing 
phase in the history of philosophy. As Kevin Mulligan shows, 
and as we have also indicated above, Brentano saw himself as a 
representative of a philosophical program originating with 
Trendelenburg.60 In retrospect it is clear however that the deci-
sive changes in Continental philosophy were due, above all, to 
the thought and personality of Franz Brentano.  
The Period After Brentano 
Recall that we are dealing in ideal types, with all the simplifi-
cation that this involves. And when dealing with the ideas of 
major philosophers such as Brentano, Husserl, or Heidegger, we 
will of course find different and conflicting tendencies, some of 
which come to full fruition only in the work of their followers. 
Bearing this in mind, we shall argue that Brentano’s own philos-
ophy, together with that of his early followers, especially 
Stumpf, Marty, Husserl, Meinong, Ehrenfels and Twardowski, 
represents the first, which is to say the flourishing, phase of gen-
uine scientific philosophy in the development of contemporary 
Continental philosophy.61 The later Husserl, with his often dog-
 
60 See Kevin Mulligan, “Sur l’histoire de l’approche analytique de 
l’histoire de la philosophie: De Bolzano et Brentano à Bennett”, in C. Chauvi-
ré (ed.), Philosophie analytique et Histoire de la philosophie, Paris: Vrin, 
1995. 
61 See Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy, op. cit. Note that there are many 
connecting points between early positivism (Mach, Avenarius) on the one 
hand, and Brentano and the early Husserl on the other hand. Note, too, that if 
Carnap was a contemporary of, say, Heidegger, this would present no diffi-
culty to those who would see Carnap as belonging to the first period and  
42 Part Two: Brentano’s Theory Applied  
 
matic and abstruse analyses, far removed from the ground-level 
of real-world experience, then represents the second phase, in 
which the theoretical interest is shorn of its reference to reality. 
This gives rise to a sceptical reaction and a turn to a practical 
orientation in the Heidegger of Being and Time. Finally, there 
comes the mystical revolution, first in Heidegger’s own later 
philosophy, and then among his successors all the way down to 
Derrida and his various ilk. 
 
Heidegger to the third. For, as we have mentioned, Kant, Reid and Hume 
were also contemporaries, yet still to be assigned to different phases. 
2. The Phase of Ascending Development 
Brentano 
The authors of this essay are both admirers of Brentano’s phi-
losophy, and thus it is understandable that they would wish to 
see Brentano as representing the first, ascending phase in the 
current cycle of philosophical development. A view of Brenta-
no’s work along these lines can be defended in substantive fash-
ion, however, in two ways. First, by pointing out the positive 
elements in Brentano’s philosophy, and second, by pointing to 
the rich legacy of Brentano’s thinking which has marked almost 
the entire course of subsequent philosophy.  
As for the first, we need only mention Brentano’s concept of 
intentionality. Although the term is of Scholastic origin, in Bren-
tano’s understanding it came to signify that special character of 
‘directedness’ or ‘aboutness’ by which mental entities can be 
distinguished from physical ones. 
It is important to see that Brentano’s philosophy embodies 
precisely the theoretical attitude which he himself recognized as 
the main characteristic of the first phase of philosophy. This the-
oretical attitude is to be seen, above all, in the fact that Brentano 
emphasizes the importance of empirical investigations in psy-
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chology. As we have seen, his understanding of ‘empiricism’ 
implies the rigorous analysis of empirical facts and of the catego-
ries they and their elements instantiate. At the same time, Bren-
tano often shows a mistrust of the idea that experiments should 
be assigned a decisive role in psychology. One of his arguments 
against the overemphasis on psychological experiments, an ar-
gument subsequently reiterated by figures as diverse as Merleau-
Ponty and J. J. Gibson, turns on the thesis that it is impossible to 
recognize the true character of mental phenomena if we examine 
them only as they exist under artificial (laboratory) circumstanc-
es. Another argument rests on the demonstration of the point-
lessness of experiment in the absence of any prior (pre-
experimental) categorial scheme in terms of which experimental-
ly testable hypotheses could be coherently formulated. This in-
dispensable categorial scheme, according to Brentano, is to be 
established via what he called the method of inner perception, 
which he considered to be the only secure way of grasping the 
inherent nature and instrinsic structure of psychological entities 
in a genuinely scientific fashion. It is this which makes Brenta-
no’s discoveries so interesting, where the experimental observa-
tions of many of his contemporaries—such as Fechner or Herbart 
or even Wundt—have sunk into forgetfulness. 
A further important field which was rediscovered and ex-
plored by Brentano in unparalleled manner is what can be termed 
analytical ontology. In contrast to Frege and other philosophers 
in the analytic tradition, Brentano bases his investigations in 
ontology not on work in the philosophy of logic and language, 
but in psychology.62 Here Brentano anticipates contemporary 
work on the ‘metaphysics of mind’ inspired by research in cogni-
tive science. Ontology or metaphysics, for Brentano, is con-
cerned with providing a full typology of beings, including, in 
Brentano’s early works, universals, propositions, possible and 
impossible objects, concepts, inexistence, past and future things, 
 
62 See Smith, Austrian Philosophy, pp. 58 ff. 
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and even absolute being. Questions concerning the relationship 
between parts and wholes (for instance between mental entities 
and their elements) also belong to Brentanian general ontology.63 
Brentano’s work in this field not only inspired Stumpf and Hus-
serl,64 but also continues to exert an important influence, directly 
or indirectly, on thinkers such as Roderick Chisholm. As 
Chisholm has shown, Brentano even anticipated detailed theories 
of contemporary cognitive metaphysics, including for example 
the so-called ‘adverbial’ account of mental phenomena. 
As for the wider influence of Brentano on contemporary phi-
losophy, we can say that without Brentano the whole phenome-
nological movement could not have come into being. Brentano 
was the teacher of Husserl, whom he influenced in a measure 
which cannot be overestimated. Through Husserl, Brentano be-
came the spiritual grandfather, as it were, of Adolf Reinach, Ro-
man Ingarden and Jan Patoc˘ka, and there are of course others, 
too, who bear the mark of the influence of Brentano through 
their indebtedness to Husserl’s work, including Sartre and others 
in French philosopy.65  
One must add, too, the influence of Brentano on contempo-
rary psychology.66 As was shown for the first time by Edward 
 
63 See Wilhelm Baumgartner’s article on Brentano in Hans Burkhardt and 
Barry Smith (eds.), Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, Munich: 
Philosophia, 1991. 
64 See Husserl’s third Logical Investigation “On the Theory of Part and 
Whole”. On the influence of this work, see Barry Smith (ed.), Parts and Mo-
ments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Munich: Philosophia, 1982. 
65 See Roman Ingarden, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, vols. 1-3, 
Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1964 -1974 (English translation of parts of vol. 1, Times 
and Modes of Being, Springfield, Ill.: Charles Thomas, 1964); Roderick 
Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1976; and also Smith (ed.), Parts and Moments, op. cit. Jan Patoc˘ka, 
Die natürliche Welt als philosophisches Problem, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990. 
For the relationship between Patoc˘ka and Brentano, see Balázs M. Mezei, 
“Brentano, Cartesianism, and Jan Patoc˘ka”, Brentano-Studien 7, 1995, 69-87. 
66 Concerning Brentano’s decisive influence, via Stumpf and Ehrenfels, on  
 2. The Phase of Ascending Development 45 
Bradford Titchener, the two main figures who have had a lasting 
influence on contemporary psychology are Brentano and 
Wundt.67 Titchener describes Brentano as the principal repre-
sentative and progenitor of cognitive psychology, or as he 
termed it, of a psychology ‘based first of all on logical argu-
ment’. He saw Wundt as someone who was committed to exper-
iments and to the mere description of experiments. Titchener 
mentions, too, the merit Brentano earned by the reintroduction of 
the term ‘intentionality’ to designate what Titchener significantly 
refers to as ‘immanent objectivity’. As a result of the fact that his 
students obtained posts in different universities in the Habsburg 
Empire, Brentano exerted influence in Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Slovenia and elsewhere.68 T. G. Masaryk, the founder and first 
President of Czechoslovakia, was himself a student of Brentano 
and invested great efforts in support of work on Brentano’s phi-
 
the Gestalt movement in psychology, both in Berlin and in Italy, see Barry 
Smith (ed.), Foundations of Gestalt Theory, Munich: Philosophia, 1988. See 
also John MacNamara and Geert-Jan Boudewijnse, “Brentano’s Influence on 
Ehrenfels’s Theory of Perceptual Gestalts”, Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour 25, 1995, 401-418. 
67 Edward Bradford Titchener, Systematic Psychology. Prolegomena, Itha-
ca and London: Cornell University Press, 1929. See also E. G. Boring, A His-
tory of Experimental Psychology, New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 
1950. 
68 For the influence of Brentano on Polish thought, see H. Skolimowski, 
Polish Analytical Philosophy, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967; and 
J. Wolenski, Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1989. For Brentanism in Italy, see Roberto Poli, “Brentano in Italy”, 
Brentano-Studien 7 (in press). For Brentanism in Slovenia, Hungary and the 
Czech Lands, see the same number of Brentano-Studien. See also Balázs M. 
Mezei, “The Brentano-School and Hungarian Philosophy”, Existentia (Buda-
pest), 1-4, 1993-94, 647-657. And also Barry Smith, “The Neurath-Haller 
Thesis: Austria and the Rise of Scientific Philosophy”, in K. Lehrer and J. C. 
Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy Past and Present. Essays in Honor of 
Rudolf Haller (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science), Dordrecht/ Bos-
ton/London: Kluwer, 1996, 1-20. 
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losophy in the 1930s, at a time when even Austria was no longer 
sympathetic to the pursuit of scientific philosophy.  
Husserl 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations, and especially its first vol-
ume, the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic”, is generally considered 
to be one of the most important contributions to twentieth-
century philosophy.69 The central topic of Husserl’s ‘Prole-
gomena’ is that of psychologism, a term which was not invented 
by Husserl but which was first clearly defined and definitively 
refuted by him in this work. According to Husserl, psychologism 
in its simplest form consists in the claim that the origin of logical 
entities and logical laws is to be located in the domain studied by 
psychology.70 Psychology would then have the task of discover-
ing such laws. Psychology is however itself a science, and thus 
in the practice of psychology logical laws are already applied. 
Clearly, on pain of circularity, the laws of logic cannot be dis-
covered through the investigations of a science in which these 
same laws are themselves applied. Logical laws must, rather, be 
prior to the specific laws investigated by the specific sciences. 
They are laws pertaining to the relations between logical entities 
such as truth and falsehood, verification and falsification, state-
ment and statement-form, inference and theory. As Husserl con-
ceives the matter in the “Prolegomena”, these logical entities 
have a kind of ideal or logical existence. The science of logic is 
thus, in echo of Bolzano, the fundamental science of science, or 
the science of theory itself.71 
Husserl shows step by step why psychology cannot serve as a 
foundation of logic and why there is a need for a theory of the 
 
69 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena. Tübingen: 
Max Niemeyer 1993. See also Husserliana, vol. XVIII. 
70 Op. cit., § 17. 
71 Op. cit., § 66. 
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possible forms, the essential characteristics, and the logical struc-
tures of scientific theories as such, a theory that would be prior 
to all other sciences. Husserl terms such a theory ‘pure logic’ and 
attributes to it three main tasks.72 First, pure logic determines the 
basic categories or forms of meanings, of objects, and of combi-
nations thereof. Second, pure logic determines the laws govern-
ing such forms—such as the laws of syllogistic reasoning. Third, 
pure logic determine a typology of possible theory-forms and of 
possible manifold-forms—the fields or systems of objects to-
wards which such theory-forms would be directed. All actual 
theories and their actual subject-matters would then be material 
instantiations of such theory-forms and manifold-forms.73 
As he puts it, any scientific theory necessarily belongs to a 
certain theoretical type. The characteristics of each such type can 
be established once and for all by formal methods analogous to 
those of mathematics. The knowledge thus gained—for instance 
concerning the logical structure through which a theory is built 
up— can then be applied in principle to an unlimited number of 
cases. The importance of the theory of theories or pure logic is 
thus in the first place methodological. As Husserl formulates it, 
pure logic is of crucial importance for any ‘sound theoretical 
research’.74 
Husserl is here at one with Brentano in viewing the theoreti-
cal attitude, which as we saw is one of the most important char-
acteristics of each ascending period in philosophy, as the attitude 
indispensable for philosophy and for science.75 In Husserl’s 
view, the theoretical attitude involves adoption of the standpoint 
of a neutral observer who is at least in principle capable of con-
sidering things objectively, as they are in themselves. Husserl’s 
concept of the theoretical attitude implies also the application of 
 
72 Op. cit., § 67. 
73 Op. cit., §§ 68, 69. 
74 Op. cit., p. 249. 
75 Op. cit., § 71. 
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logical rigour and of clarity in formulating the results of theoreti-
cal reflections. 
It is noteworthy, however, that Husserl fulfils only one of the 
two Brentanian requirements for the sort of sound philosophy 
that is characteristic of the first, ascending phase. The second 
requirement is the use of a method that is essentially appropriate 
to nature. For it seems that, for Husserl, this requirement must 
lead to a standpoint of psychologism. If philosophy is about na-
ture, or if philosophy requires a method that is somehow true to 
nature, then philosophy becomes once more a science of facts. 
As such, however, it is not capable of fulfilling the functions of 
that ‘pure’ theoretical science which is, in Husserl’s eyes, a pre-
prequisite of all other scientific investigation. 
Here we see a point in Husserl which led him to his later phe-
nomenological views. In the “Prolegomena” Husserl stressed 
that one of the main tasks of pure theory is to determine what he 
calls the ‘logical’ (in a later version of the text: ‘phenomenologi-
cal’) origin of basic concepts. This origin is made accessible to 
the philosopher via what Husserl later termed ‘insight into es-
sences’.76 By exaggerating the ideal character of his theory of 
theories, and by overemphasizing the gap between it and the 
natural sciences, Husserl prepared the way for his later ‘tran-
scendental phenomenological turn’, in which no feature that is 
appropriate to nature has a place. 
 
76 Op. cit., § 67. 
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Husserl’s method in the Logical Investigations is eidetic: it al-
lows us, for example, to grasp the meaning ‘four’ when we are 
faced with a group of four material things, via a kind of interpret-
ing abstraction. It allows us also to grasp the essential forms of 
things and their various formal relations, above all the relations 
of part-whole and dependence. By setting forth the general laws 
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governing these relations, Husserl introduces the new discipline 
of ‘formal ontology’. 
Husserl clearly recognized that the final message of the Logi-
cal Investigations remains ambiguous. On the one hand he insist-
ed that pure logic was a universal theory of the basic logical 
forms, a theory reached by means of eidetic analysis. On the 
other hand, he still held on to the idea of philosophy as ‘descrip-
tive psychology’—as a discipline which, in its original form, 
belongs to the empirical sciences. Husserl’s problem arose from 
the fact that a natural-scientific discipline such as descriptive 
psychology does not seem to be capable of offering a compre-
hensive theoretical description of the natural sciences as a whole. 
One possible solution to this problem was proposed by Paul 
Natorp in his 1901 
article on Husserl: this consists in embracing a neo-Kantian 
apri- 
oristic transcendentalism, i.e. in accepting the thesis that the the-
oretical science which is to ground the axioms of the natural sci-
ences must be based on evident principles governing a ‘transcen-
dental’ realm that is knowable a priori.77 Husserl, however, 
adopted another solution: he endeavored to work out a special 
method by means of which both descriptive psychology as a nat-
ural science on the one hand, and epistemological realism in the 
sense of the radical refusal of Kantian and neo-Kantian apriorism 
on the other hand, could be embraced side-by-side by relating 
both to a single realm, which he called, perhaps infelicitously, 
the phenomenal. This new phenomenal realm, hitherto only 
glimpsed by philosophers and now for the first time able to be 
properly explored, was then to become the object of a new uni-
versal science, the science of ‘phenomenology’. 
 
77 See Paul Natorp, “Zur Frage der logischen Methode” (The Question of 
Logical Method), Kant-Studien 6, 1901. Reprinted in Hermann Noack (ed.), 
Husserl, Darmstadt, 1973. 
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Husserl’s Move to Phenomenology 
How is Husserl’s move to phenomenology as universal sci-
ence to be evaluated in the light of the Brentanian schema of the 
four phases? According to Brentano, the first phase of decline is 
characterized by the weakening or distortion of scientific interest 
on the one hand, and by a turn to practical motives on the oth-
er.78 
As for the latter, Husserl insisted throughout his life on the 
importance of the theoretical approach in philosophy, so much so 
that anybody who did not follow him in his understanding of this 
approach he considered a captive of the naturalistic fallacy, in 
other words of the view that logical laws can be derived from 
psychological facts. It must be mentioned, however that the turn 
to practicality means for Brentano the adoption of a strong ethi-
cal emphasis in philosophy, and Husserl’s phenomenology, es-
pecially in its later phases, was indeed marked by precisely such 
an interest: the adoption of the theoretical attitude is, he says, 
the moral obligation of the philosopher, and indeed Husserl 
saw himself with his phenomenology as fulfilling a divine ‘mis-
sion’.79 
The idea of the ‘phenomenological reduction’, introduced by 
Husserl around 1907,80 shows clearly that Husserlian philosophy 
in fact contains features that are characteristic of Brentano’s first 
declining phase. The phenomenological reduction is, as Husserl 
says, a matter of ‘suspending’ the ‘natural attitude’ in which we 
normally live—of withholding belief in the objects toward which 
our mental acts are directed in order to examine the functioning 
and the intentionality of these acts themselves. This ‘suspension’ 
is applied also to scientific acts. By universalizing the reduction, 
 
78 See below, p. 86. 
79 See Karl Schuhmann’s Introduction to Husserl’s Briefwechsel (Hus-
serliana, vol. 10), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994, p. 7.  
80 In his “The Idea of Phenomenology”, 1907 (Die Idee der Phänomeno-
logie. Fünf Vorlesungen, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958.) 
 3. The First Phase of Decline: The Later Husserl 51 
however, Husserl runs into serious contradictions, which he him-
self discovered later in the second book of his Ideas81 and in his 
Crisis of European Sciences.82 For it is not clear how, according 
to his later view, it is possible for us to be both empirical and 
concrete subjects on the one hand, and to carry out a universal 
suspension of reality on the other. It seems that, by thus univer-
salizing the scope of his reduction,83 Husserl can no longer meet 
one of the requirements of the ascending phase: the requirement 
of a method that is appropriate to nature. Through the universal 
reduction, the Husserlian methodology loses all contact with 
reality, that is, with the very world about which phenomenology 
was to yield true propositions. But if empirical reality is lost, 
then the propositions of phenomenology lose an ultimate context 
of reference and testability.84 
A further point concerns the weakening or distortion of the 
scientific interest in the first phase of decline. As we have al-
ready seen, Husserl insisted on a kind of theoretical interest in 
his phenomenology. He saw phenomenology as a means of trans-
forming philosophy into a strict science, a means of providing 
philosophy with a rigorous methodological foundation and a 
clear and well-established terminology. It seems, however, that 
there is at least one sense in which we can say that Husserl in his 
 
81 Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Phi-
losophie, Book II, Husserliana III/1. See Barry Smith, “Common Sense”, in 
B. Smith and D. W. Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 394 -436. 
82 Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und transzendentale Phänome-
nologie, Husserliana VI. 
83 Interestingly, those disciples of Husserl who did not follow him in 
adopting transcendental idealism warned him of the danger of such a stand-
point, a warning which Husserl however refused to accept. See for instance 
Max Scheler’s Vom Ewigen im Menschen (On the Eternal in Man), Berlin: 
Der Neue Geist, 1933, p. 101. 
84 Karl Schuhmann, and Barry Smith, “Against Idealism: Johannes Daub-
ert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I”, Review of Metaphysics 39, 1985, 763-93. 
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phenomenology precisely abandoned the properly scientific 
method. As Husserl’s distinguished pupil Roman Ingarden re-
ports,85 the reason why he could not accept the Husserlian results 
and discoveries presented in the first volume of the Ideas was 
that Husserl’s arguments were rather sketchy, brief, and lacking 
in sufficiently thorough and precise analyses of empirical facts 
and observations.  
We can agree with Ingarden that Husserl’s later writings 
cannot be compared in logical rigour and detailed character 
either to those of Brentano or to his own earlier writings. This 
might sound strange, since even the later Husserl is far more 
scientific in orientation and far more rigorous and logically 
coherent than some of his followers, as becomes immediately 
clear if we compare his writings with those of the Heideggerian 
school. Yet we can still say that Husserl tended more and more 
to rely on generalities and methodological proposals rather than 
on the honest toil of detailed philosophical description, argument 
and analysis. Husserl had earlier, following the proposal of the 
Austrian scientist Ernst Mach, talked of philosophy ‘from 
below’, as opposed to a Hegelian philosophy of metaphysical 
speculations ‘from above’. In his new understanding we find in 
contrast a kind of general metaphysics not exempt from traces of 
mysticism. Husserl’s new, ‘phenomenological’ turn to the 
traditional problems in philosophy was accompanied, too, by the 
adoption of a transcendental position of the sort similar to what 
was propounded by Natorp and others in the very Kantian 
tradition he had earlier rejected.  
These tendencies of Husserl’s later thought prepared the way 
for Heidegger. We can say that, in turning to the traditional ques-
tions of philosophy—above all to the problem of ‘transcendental 
consciousness’—Husserl in a sense chose to embrace a histori-
cally inherited problematic in preference to his own, theoretical-
 
85 See Roman Ingarden, “What is New in Husserl’s Crisis?”, in Analecta 
Husserliana, 2, 1972. 
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ly defined, problems.86 Heidegger, too, followed a similar path: 
while raising the ‘question of being’—one of the central ques-
tions of Aristotelianism87—he turned to a type of historically 
determined philosophy, and thereby renounced the essence of the 
original Husserlian phenomenology as the unprejudiced and pre-
suppositionless investigation of reality. 
 
86 See Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl’s Concept of Philosophy”, Journal of 
the British Society for Phenomenology, 21, 1990, 274 -83. 
87 One should remember that the most decisive philosophical experience 
of the young Heidegger was his reading of Brentano’s dissertation Von der 
mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, Freiburg: Herder, 
1862. English translation: On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, Berke-
ley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1975.  
4. The Second Phase of Decline: The Early Heidegger 
The second phase of decline is, Brentano says, characterized 
by a ‘spiritual revolution’ that is intended to overcome the results 
of the first phase of decline. As we shall see, we find this feature 
in full-blown form in Heidegger’s early philosophy. Since, how-
ever, the ‘revolutionary’ character of Heidegger’s early thought 
is not so obvious to many of his readers, we shall need to consid-
er this point more thoroughly.  
Recall that Brentano gave two versions of the content of the 
first phase of decline. One version speaks of the turn to practical-
ity; the other speaks of the theoretical interest becoming dogmat-
ic. ‘Dogmatic’, here, means that the openness to empirical reality 
and to experience in general—which is characteristic of the as-
cending phase—is replaced by a system of imposed ideas (or 
‘prejudices’ in Brentano’s terms) which serves as a determining 
factor when it comes to interpreting experience. Dogmatism, 
then, is a form of idealism or apriorism, which according to 
Brentano excludes the possibility of sound philosophical activity. 
In this sense, we can consider Husserl’s later philosophy ‘dog-
matic’.  
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Heidegger’s Revolt 
This feature of dogmatism in Husserl was the main target of 
Heidegger’s early, ‘revolutionary’ thought. Against Husserl’s 
view that the starting point of philosophy is consciousness, 
Heidegger insisted that the starting point of philosophy must be 
reality as a whole, or, in his own terminology, ‘being’.88 
Heidegger’s reasoning was as follows. Even if we accept, with 
the idealists, that being is in some sense contained in conscious-
ness in general (so that things exist only as intentional objects), 
we can still formulate the question concerning the being of con-
sciousness itself. If even the being of consciousness is that of a 
mere intentional object, then we seem to be locked in a vicious 
circle. The question, therefore, which must come first, is the one 
concerning being. We must ask what being is, or, in Heidegger’s 
words, we must repeat the ‘ancient question of being’. 
Heidegger thus believes himself to have shown that the cen-
tral point in the later Husserl’s philosophy was in fact dogmatic, 
and Heidegger’s reaction to Husserlian philosophy can be seen 
as a ‘revolt’ against the latter’s dogmatism. But Heidegger’s phi-
losophy was ‘revolutionary’ in another sense too. Already in 
 
88 Heidegger’s standpoint is well documented in his interpretation of the 
term ‘phenomenology’ in Being and Time (Chapter 2, section C). As 
Heidegger rightly notes, the term comes from the Greek ‘legein ta phainome-
na’, that is ‘talking about the phenomena (about the things observed)’. With a 
curious switch, however, Heidegger substitutes the Greek verb ‘legein’ (talk-
ing about something, giving an account of something) with another verb, 
‘apophainesthai’ (displaying something of one’s own, declaring one’s opin-
ion) as if ‘legein’ and ‘apophainesthai’ had the same meaning. The difference 
between their meanings is however this: ‘legein ta phainomena’ implies that 
there is a subject that gives an account of certain objects; ‘apophainesthai ta 
phainomena’ on the other hand means: to let the things appear as they are in 
themselves, a meaning which more or less eliminates the role of the rational 
subject. Heidegger’s fault is not that he interprets the former expression by 
means of the latter, but rather that he suggests that the two meanings are the 
same. 
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Being and Time, Heidegger sought to develop a comprehensive 
critique of the entire history of Western thought. He considered 
his programme of ‘the destruction of the history of ontology’ as 
an important means by which to develop his own ontology of 
‘being’.89 By the ‘destruction of the history of ontology’ 
Heidegger meant a thorough criticism of the most characteristic 
tenets and presuppositions of Western philosophical thought.  
Heidegger saw himself, then, as a ‘revolutionary’ thinker 
whose thought contained not only a devastating criticism of past 
philosophies but also implied a new, revolutionary approach to 
the problems of philosophy resting on the unique importance of 
the understanding of being.90 
Recall that even Heidegger does not speak about being as 
such as the proper thematic object of his ontology. Although he 
raises the famous Leibnizian question—‘Why is there something 
at all rather than nothing?’—he does not think that his task is to 
oppose a traditional or objectivist ontology to Husserl’s tran-
scendental-idealist position. As he expresses the matter in sever-
al places and in various forms, being as such is not accessible to 
philosophy. We find being, rather, in the concrete being of man. 
Man is not vouchsafed any kind of access to a common realm of 
being except via the analysis of the concrete human being him-
self. 
Heidegger’s Subjectivism 
As Hans-Georg Gadamer rightly states in his book Truth and 
Method, 1960, Heidegger’s point to the effect that being as such 
is inaccessible to philosophy contains no essential theoretical 
 
89 Being and Time, especially § 6. 
90 Heidegger’s revolutionary attitude, however, originated in the ideal of a 
‘conservative revolution’, see Hans Albert, Kritik der reinen Hermeneutik, 
Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1994, p. 33. 
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novelty as compared to the Husserlian position.91 Like Husserl, 
Heidegger too tries to ground in the subjective realm a philoso-
phy which would claim general validity. Husserl, however, 
makes several attempts to understand this subjective realm in 
terms of general features knowable a priori. He holds that his 
‘phenomenological’ method can yield knowledge of the essential 
forms of consciousness as such. Heidegger, on the other hand, 
denies that there is an essential form of consciousness distinct 
from its realization in the physical, social and historical existence 
of man. Philosophy must therefore concentrate on the concrete 
human being, on his emotional life, on his body as well as on his 
sociological situation and historical status. The problem is that it 
is not clear how it is possible to concentrate on the concrete hu-
man being as the object of one’s philosophizing and at the same 
time make general propositions which might claim objective 
validity. How, in other words, is Heidegger to make the step 
from the particular to the general?  
The project of Being and Time is the return to that basic struc-
ture in everyday reality in which conceptual thinking is original-
ly rooted. The task of a new ontology, according to Heidegger, 
consists precisely in the discovery of the origin of conceptual 
thinking from the point of view of everyday reality. Heidegger 
thus introduced such key terms into his philosophy as, for in-
stance, Sorge (‘care’) and Sein zum Tode (‘being toward death’, 
‘being rendered to die’), terms which had before Being and Time 
played no central role in philosophy.92 Such terms, Heidegger 
held, are much better able to express philosophical notions than 
terms borrowed, for instance, from the neo-Kantian or positivist 
philosophy of his time. 
 
91 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method), Tü-
bingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960. 2, I, 3, b. 
92 There are of course well-known exceptions such as Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche and it is no accident that both of these thinkers strongly influenced 
Heidegger’s philosophy. 
 4. The Second Phase of Decline: The Early Heidegger 57 
The problem, however, is that this very search for the every-
day origin of conceptual thinking must be carried out in an ab-
stract language. True, Heidegger’s concepts are different from 
those of traditional philosophy. Instead of human being, he says 
‘Dasein’; instead of talking of historical and cultural determining 
factors in human existence he speaks of ‘Befindlichkeit’ (rough-
ly: ‘situatedness’). Yet it would be difficult to deny that 
Heidegger operates with abstract concepts in Being and Time and 
and that these concepts are understood and applied as such in his 
work. An important question, never raised in Being and Time, is 
not how he arrives at such abstract concepts, but rather how con-
ceptual thinking is to be eliminated. For when referring to ‘eve-
rydayness’, that is to a common everyday experience in men, as 
the origin of our conceptual thinking, Heidegger already presup-
poses that it is possible to think and do philosophy other than 
through an abstract conceptual framework. This presupposition 
is, however, never made explicit and it is never clarified in his 
works. Indeed, in his early writings such supposedly non-abstract 
terms as Sorge or Befindlichkeit are themselves explained by 
means of abstract notions. Thus he explains Sorge (‘care’) as 
meaning ‘the formal and existential unity of the ontological 
structures of human existence taken in its entirety’.93  
What we see, then, is that, while Heidegger stood opposed to 
Husserlian idealism, he was not able to establish any other basis, 
either real or mental, by which the general validity of proposi-
tions making up his new doctrine could be secured. Indeed, in 
understanding the task of ontology in terms of the analysis of 
concrete human existence, he expresses a deep-rooted scepticism 
towards the very idea of a common realm of general validities. 
Interestingly enough, it was Husserl who referred to the notion 
of scepticism more often and more emphatically than did 
Heidegger. Husserl’s scepticism, however, was methodological, 
and served as a means to the end of gaining evident knowledge. 
 
93 See Being and Time, § 41. 
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Husserl bases his concept of methodological scepticism on the 
method of reduction, that is on reducing the contents of con-
sciousness to their essential forms. Heidegger in contrast seems 
nowhere to recognize the importance of such a methodological 
clarification of philosophy. His mistrust of traditional conceptual 
thinking betrays however that his philosophy is indeed sceptical 
in character.  
The New Definition of ‘Phenomenon’ 
Heidegger’s mistrust is illustrated in his proposed redefinition 
of the term ‘phenomenon’ which had originally been one of the 
most important expressions in Husserl’s phenomenology.94 For 
Husserl, a phenomenon is a sense-datum reduced to its essential 
core, as we might say, in such a way that it is capable of disclos-
ing an elementary constituent of reality, a constituent which can 
be evidently grasped. Phenomenology in Husserl’s view is a sys-
tematic description of such phenomena. 
Heidegger, in contrast, distinguishes between ‘phenomenon’ 
as signifying ‘something which shows itself’ (in accordance with 
the Greek meaning of the word, in German: Phänomen), and 
‘phenomenon’ as signifying a kind of token or sign of something 
which in itself remains in a certain way hidden. Another label for 
this second kind of phenomenon (in German: Erscheinung) is 
‘symptom’. A symptom provides us with the evidence of disease, 
that is, it indicates the presence of some kind of disorder, but it 
does not make clear the very nature of the problem. Normally, 
Heidegger argues, we do not have ‘phenomena’ in the first sense 
of the term in our everyday experience, but only Erscheinungen, 
that is, only signs or indications of hidden contents. We need to 
have special methods in order to explore this hidden content of 
Erscheinungen. Accordingly, in Heidegger’s eyes, the task of 
phenomenology as the ‘science of the phenomena’ is not a sort 
 
94 See Being and Time, § 7a. 
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of description and explanation of evidently given data, but rather 
a kind of complex, tricky procedure, also termed ‘hermeneutics’, 
which has the task of exposing what is concealed by complex 
textures of Erscheinungen in Being and Time. Heidegger called 
this procedure Daseinsanalytik: it is a procedure of philosophical 
‘analysis’ of the concrete human subject.  
In his new definition of the term ‘phenomenon’ Heidegger 
expressed his deep-rooted skepticism concerning the method and 
the epistemological principles of Husserlian phenomenology. 
Heidegger thereby initiated a departure from that scientific atti-
tude which had characterized the work of the most important 
Continental European thinkers since Brentano, and he thereby 
instituted the rift between ‘Continental’ and ‘analytic’ philoso-
phies that has been so fateful for philosophy, even in English-
speaking countries, in recent years. 
Heidegger as a Philosopher of Decline 
In sum, then, we can say that the main features of the second 
declining phase of the Brentanian schema can indeed be found in 
the philosophy of the early Heidegger. Heidegger’s thought 
gives rise to a calling into question of the very possibility of the-
oretical philosophy itself—an attitude which was then embraced 
by representatives of the French existentialist school such as 
Jean-Paul Sartre.  
It is precisely in the philosophy of the early Heidegger that 
the notion of a theoretical attitude, indispensable for philosophy 
according to both Brentano and Husserl, completely disappears. 
Heidegger’s philosophy of existence claims to be a theory of 
being, that is, an ontology. At the same time, however, 
Heidegger fails to provide any clear account of the relevant new 
understanding of theory. By eliminating the notion of the 
Husserlian ‘phenomenon’ and by not replacing Husserl’s 
phenomenological method with any other methodological 
instrument, the early Heidegger has succeeded in crafting a 
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philosophy that comes dangerously close to what Brentano 
called a work of philosopher’s fancy.  
5. The Third Phase of Decline: The Later Heidegger 
As we have seen, one of the central elements of the Brentani-
an schema was that of challenge. It is this element which is the 
primary motor of the four phase cycle. The early philosophy of 
Heidegger is very often seen precisely as a reaction to Husserlian 
phenomenology, and as has been well documented in Theodore 
Kisiel’s The Genesis of Being and Time, Heidegger, even while 
pretending to be a follower of Husserl, depicted him in private 
letters as his main enemy, as that against which he was fighting.  
As is also well known, it was Heidegger himself who most 
strongly criticized his own earlier thinking as presented in Being 
and Time. In this early work his task had been to revise and re-
form Western philosophy, which had, he thought, gone astray at 
a very early stage. His project was based on the conviction that 
the whole tradition of Western philosophy needed to be rejected, 
or was at least in need of radical reform. Being and Time howev-
er remained a fragment, and its second part has never been pub-
lished. As Heidegger himself reported on several occasions, the 
reason for this was that he became less and less convinced that 
his original idea of a universal reform of philosophy could in fact 
be carried out in the way he had intended.  
The ‘Ontological Difference’ 
Heidegger’s self-criticism was grounded in the idea of what 
he called the ‘ontological difference’.95 Heidegger distinguished 
between two types of being: concrete existing being (Seiendes), 
 
95 See especially Heidegger’s Identität und Differenz, Pfullingen: Neske, 
1957. 
 5. The Third Phase of Decline: The Later Heidegger 61 
and being as such (Sein), a distinction that is rooted in the Scho-
lastic distinction between ‘being in its own right’ (esse a se, that 
is: God) and ‘being depending on other beings’ (esse ab alio). 
Heidegger however substituted for the notion of ‘being in its 
own right’ his own undefined notion of ‘being as such’ (Sein), 
thus seeking to eliminate any theistic connotations from the 
presentation of his views. This ‘being as such’ remains, in Kanti-
an fashion, somehow mysterious and never accessible to the hu-
man mind, while being in the concrete sense, that is: man, is sus-
ceptible to a specifically Heideggerian sort of ‘existential analy-
sis’.  
Already in Being and Time Heidegger held that the main task 
of philosophy is to provide a genuine description of being as 
such. Concrete beings and being as such are, he held, to be con-
sidered in radically different terms, since being as such cannot be 
considered a genus.96 A genus differs from a species precisely in 
what it does not contain. Thus cat is distinct from mammal in 
virtue of dogs, whales, kangaroos and so on. Being, however, is 
contained in every being, even in the being or existence of gene-
ra and species themselves. Being, therefore, cannot itself be a 
genus. And since concepts are always of genera, being as such 
cannot be grasped by concepts. Being lies outside conceptual 
thinking.  
In Heidegger’s later view, the history of philosophy is a pro-
cess of perpetual decline.97 Being as such was more correctly 
grasped by philosophers at the beginning of this process than it 
was by later thinkers. During the history of philosophy being as 
such has been progressively forgotten. Whenever philosophers 
tried to speak of being as such they made the mistake of substi-
tuting for the concept of being as such the concept of some par-
 
96 See Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, vol. 33. pp. 36 ff. 
97 See for instance his interview in Der Spiegel, September 22, 1966. The 
text can be found also in G. Neske and E. Kettering (eds.), Antwort. Martin 
Heidegger im Gespräch, Pfullingen: Neske, 1988. 
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ticular being (for example the concept of substance).98 As 
Heidegger intermittently suggested, it is due to this mistake, and 
perhaps to other factors in human nature itself, that being as such 
has never been grasped in the necessary or proper way. 
Interestingly, Heidegger later considered his own earlier writ-
ings as expressions of this very same progressive decline. In his 
writings prepared after the ‘turn’ in his thinking (the ‘Kehre’) in 
the 1930s, he refused the possibility of any conceptual ontology 
of the traditional sort. Indeed, he considered contemporary 
‘technical civilization’, both that of Nazi Germany and of the 
Soviet Union, as well as that of the United States, to be a conse-
quence of traditional philosophical thinking.  
He characterized technical progress as an expression of man’s 
striving for mastery over nature, and thereby as an attempt to 
overcome man’s primeval status as a being subdued by the ele-
mental forces of nature. Primevally, Heidegger held, man had 
greater opportunity to realize an authentic life, a life which is not 
directed against the forces of nature but rather accepts the neces-
sity of being subdued by these forces. In Heidegger’s view, the 
contraposed type of thinking led, first, to the birth of the natural 
sciences, and then to ‘technical civilization’. The latter, above 
all, is seen as having ‘totalized’ man’s rule over nature to a de-
gree which endangers human existence. Inasmuch as modern 
science failed to fulfill its original task—the task of helping 
mankind—by contributing to terrible wars and to what 
Heidegger sees as the despoiling of the planet, philosophy too 
has lost its legitimacy as a benefactor of mankind. Philosophy 
has reached its fitting end in modern technical civilization. 
Yet being was not ab ovo closed to the philosopher; it is still 
possible to find access to it, yet in a way completely different 
from that of traditional European philosophy—including 
Heidegger’s own early thought. Being opens itself up to us in the 
genuine sense primarily in the most natural and essential uses of 
 
98 See his Identität und Differenz, op. cit. 
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language, which occur in the best lyric poetry. Heidegger’s own 
poetic experiments have not, though, proved unreservedly suc-
cessful.99 
The Concept of ‘Dasein’ 
As we have already seen, Heidegger attempted to ground his 
ontology on the concept of the concrete human being or of what 
he called Dasein. In an analysis presented in paragraph 29 of 
Being and Time he tried to define the most important 
characteristic trait of human existence. He proposed two 
possibilities in terms of ‘understanding’ or Verstehen, and 
‘situatedness’ or Befindlichkeit. He investigated and rejected the 
thesis that the nature of human existence is determined by 
understanding, that is the thesis that human being is a ‘rational 
animal’. Rather, he held, human existence is determined by 
Befindlichkeit, a term which is based on the verb ‘(sich) 
befinden’.  
As so often happens, Heidegger here was playing with the 
various meanings of the term. ‘Sich befinden’ has the following 
important meanings: 1. to be situated; 2. to be located; 3. to be in 
 
99 See the poems included in his collected works (Gesamtausgabe), vol. 
13, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (Pieces from Experiences of Thought), 
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. Here is a piece of 
Heidegger’s poetry, translated by Albert Hofstadter, from A. Hofstadter (ed.), 
Martin Heidegger. Poetry, Language, Thought, New York: Harper and Row, 
1971, p. 14: 
Forests spread 
Brooks plunge 
Rocks persist 
Mist defuses 
Meadows wait 
Springs well 
Winds dwell 
Blessing muses. 
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some state; 4. to feel (when somebody finds himself to be in a 
certain mental or physical state or disposition). Human existence 
is now ‘situated’ in the sense that it is located in space and time, 
and is determined by physical and other circumstances. Playing 
with the other meanings, however, Heidegger suggested also that 
a certain mental or psychic attitude (a disposition, mood, spirit) 
is one of the most important features of human existence. 
Heidegger thus rejects the traditional definition of human being 
as animal rationale in favour of allusions to a basic mood or 
disposition as well as to physical, social and historical determin-
ing factors in a way which amounts to a radically new interpreta-
tion of the essence of man. As he himself wrote: ‘Understanding 
is always disposed.’100 This radically new interpretation still re-
mains unexplained in Heidegger’s writings however. What we 
have, instead, is a series of gnomic texts in which the philosoph-
ical content, wrapped up in literary formulations of fluctuating 
quality, is difficult to grasp.  
The Destruction of Ontology 
Another important element in Heidegger’s thought—his no-
tion of the ‘destruction’ of the tradition of ontology introduced in 
Being and Time—is further radicalized in his idea of the ‘trans-
cending of ontology’ developed in the 1960s. By the ‘destruction 
of ontology’ Heidegger meant a kind of phenomenological anal-
ysis of the work of earlier philosophers of such a sort that it 
would enable us to grasp the experience underlying each.101 By 
the ‘transcending of ontology’, however, he meant a radical re-
fusal of all the philosophical traditions of the past. As he formu-
lated it, the main purpose of his non-ontological philosophy is to 
express what remains unexpressed in the works belonging to the 
 
100 ‘Verstehen ist immer gestimmtes.’ Being and Time, § 31. 
101 Op. cit., § 6, p. 22. 
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tradition of ontology.102 While in his earlier writings Heidegger 
tended to devalue the importance of the history of philosophy—
in many ways echoing Husserlian criticisms—his later attitude is 
based on the idea that the history of philosophy has already come 
to an end. If we speak about ‘philosophy’ we necessarily allude 
to one segment of the history of philosophy; if, however, we 
want to address problems that are not raised during the history of 
philosophy, then we are no longer ‘philosophizing’ but doing 
something else, something that, according to Heidegger, cannot 
be expressed in rational terms but only in terms related to poetry 
or mysticism.103 
Heidegger and Nazism 
As Brentano writes, in the final phase of the decline of phi-
losophy, people try to reach truths otherwise not capable of be-
ing grasped by means of mystical insights and other irrational 
powers.104 If one thinks of Heidegger’s connections to Nazism 
and to Nazi ideology, even the term ‘pathological’ seems to be 
applicable to parts of his philosophy. As is well known, 
Heidegger associated himself with the National Socialist Party in 
Germany during the early 1930s and remained a member of this 
party until the end of the war. In his famous speech as the first 
Nazi rector of the University of Freiburg in April 1933, he de-
scribed the main purposes of university studies in terms clearly 
designed to appeal to his Nazi audience. He defined, for instance, 
the ‘spiritual world’ of a nation as consisting in its rootedness in 
‘the blood and the soil’, rather than in terms of science and rea-
son.105 He spoke, too, of the important role of ‘leading’ individu-
 
102 See for instance Heidegger’s Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1967, p. 194. 
103 See Heidegger’s Identität und Differenz, op. cit., p. 61. 
104 See below, p. 86. 
105 See his Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität (The Self- 
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als and of their ‘leading’ the nation as a whole on the path to 
historical destiny. Perhaps even more importantly, he renounces 
‘academic freedom’ as being not appropriate to the ‘concept of 
freedom of German students’.106  
Even if Heidegger’s romantic and somewhat Wagnerian-
sounding rhetoric was insufficiently Nazi for the Ministry of 
Education at that time, and even if, in consequence, he had to 
give up his position as rector very soon after this famous speech, 
still, Heidegger’s close connection over several years to such an 
extreme ideology throws a suspicious light on his philosophy. In 
his notes107 to his Rektoratsrede of 1933 he tried retrospectively 
to explain his behavior as Nazi rector, which he claims proves 
quite clearly that his role at the university was not in itself nega-
tive or harmful; the words in his speech, however, show very 
well the connections between Nazism and the mysticism and 
irrationalism of the Heideggerian philosophy. 
Heidegger’s followers of course attribute an exceptional kind 
of philosophical method to their master, by which they hold that 
it was somehow possible for him to break free of such associa-
tions. Heidegger himself speaks in this connection as if the ulti-
mate ‘method’ in philosophy was a kind of passivity, a passivity 
which would enable one to experience the ‘revelation’ of being 
as such.108 It must be clearly seen that the undoubtedly interest-
ing and inspiring religious and poetic implications of this, as of 
many other Heideggerian notions, cannot conceal from us the 
 
Assertion of the German University), Breslau: Korn Verlag, 1933. 
106 It must be noted however that Heidegger’s emphasis on ‘leadership’ 
and on the person of the leader in politics was a commonplace in political 
literature in his time. One finds these ideas in the works of such authors as for 
instance Max Weber (see Weber’s Politik als Beruf), who otherwise did not 
share Heidegger’s political commitments. 
107 Das Rektorat. Erstveröffentlichung einer Niederschrift aus dem Jahre 
1945 (The Rectorship), edited and published by Hermann Heidegger, 1983. 
108 See Heidegger’s “Zeit und Sein”, in his Zur Sache des Denkens (Con-
cerning the Problems of Thinking), Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969. 
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inherent philosophical difficulties in his thinking. For Heidegger 
seems to neglect precisely those standards of philosophical ar-
gument which alone could lead in justified fashion either to an 
acceptance or to a refusal of his assertions.  
By not applying, or even accepting, traditional philosophical 
standards and methods, Heidegger’s thought comes very close to 
what Brentano described in his fourth phase also in this respect: 
that it brings philosophy in proximity to what is usually termed 
‘literature’. Already in Being and Time, Heidegger’s language is 
very often poetically ambiguous. We can agree with Stegmül-
ler’s criticism that Heidegger’s philosophy is in many ways a 
kind of ‘word-painting’ (Wortmalerei).109 In his later works, 
Heidegger becomes more and more determined to deprive the 
style and language of his writing of all traces of its earlier tone of 
logical rigour.110  
Heidegger’s fashion of philosophizing has in this respect in-
fluenced leading schools in contemporary Continental philosoph-
ical life. Authors as important as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Karl 
Rahner, Jan Patoc˘ka and Emmanuel Levinas, as well as Jacques 
Derrida, have inherited central notions of the Heideggerian phi-
losophy and applied the ‘method’ they found therein.  
The ‘End of Philosophy’ 
One of these Heideggerian notions, that of the ‘end of philos-
ophy’, has become a fashionable term in the works of a number 
of contemporary writers. They may be right, in the sense that 
philosophy of a Heideggerian kind has in fact reached its end. 
This is exactly what we are trying to show in this essay. They 
are, on the other hand, obviously wrong insofar as they declare 
 
109 Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, vol. I, Stuttgart: Alfred 
Kröner Verlag, 1989, p. 177. 
110 This is not true, however, of his university lectures, in which he con-
tinued to adhere to the old standards. 
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the end of the very possibility of scientific philosophy, of philos-
ophy in the proper sense. This declaration is nullified by the fact 
that even in Continental Europe, and especially in Austrian, 
German, Polish, Czech and Hungarian philosophy, we can today 
observe a revival of the scientific orientation and also a lessening 
of the Heideggerian influence.111 Those who pronounce the end 
of philosophy, moreover, presuppose that there is a present in 
which it becomes somehow possible to grasp the totality of the 
history of philosophy and in which it is theoretically possible to 
evaluate the different accounts of the history of philosophy. This 
point however implies what they want to deny, that is the conti-
nuity of philosophy itself. 
 
111 In Germany, however, we find even now a historical approach to phi-
losophy, described by Sidney Hook as follows: “For a philosopher, to be 
without historical antecedents in Germany is to be without standing, a 
stranger in the realm of mind. Everyone is intent on showing that his views 
are not only compatible with, but complete and bring to full flower, the 
thought of his predecessors. Consequently, the study of the history of philos-
ophy and its reformulation is the chief activity of academic philosophers. The 
problems of philosophy tend to be presented in terms of their history, not in 
terms of their logic.” Sidney Hook, “A Personal Impression of Contemporary 
German Philosophy”, The Journal of Philosophy 27, 1930, 141-160. 
6. After Heidegger: The Thought of Emmanuel Levinas 
To illustrate the consequences of Heideggerian philosophy, 
we shall briefly consider one example: the thought of Emmanuel 
Levinas. We could have chosen other philosophers, such as Jean-
Paul Sartre; or we could have chosen Derrida and his various 
contemporaries. Sartre, however, seems to belong rather to the 
second phase of decline, embodying a transitional form between 
politically oriented, practical philosophy and an understanding of 
philosophy as literature. Derrida, on the other hand, belongs de-
cisively to the fourth phase and he seems to have given up any 
claim to be taken seriously at all. Instead, he tries to shock his 
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readers by embracing ever more preposterous forms of literary 
and political exhibitionism.  
Levinas, in contrast, is a philosopher who received his first, 
decisive philosophical impressions precisely from Husserl him-
self. Levinas’ writings are meant to be taken seriously; there are 
arguments in them, and there is, above all, a philosophical idea, 
the idea of infinity, which lends Levinas’ views a certain unity. 
Moreover, Levinas’ writings, like those of Heidegger, undoubt-
edly possess many literary and religious merits. By analyzing his 
philosophy, we can indeed see how a philosophical tradition, that 
of Husserl, initiated in terms of a rigorous scientific endeavour, 
could become so intimately connected to literature and ‘revela-
tion’. This means, first of all, a change in the values which the 
philosopher is striving to realize. 
In his very first work, published in 1930 under the title The 
Theory of Intuition in the Phenomenology of Husserl,112 Levinas 
offers a remarkable interpretation of Husserlian philosophy. He 
argues that what he calls Husserl’s ‘immanentism’ and the 
Heideggerian philosophy of being can be reduced to a single 
common denominator: Husserl’s phenomenology is an ontology 
no less than Heidegger’s philosophy is. Where, however, 
Heidegger considers being in its static character, Husserl’s ap-
proach, especially in his analyses of time, is concentrated on a 
dynamic understanding of being. These claims are defended sys-
tematically and with a certain rigour. 
Only later did Levinas, under the influence of the later 
Heidegger, begin to develop a language which was gradually 
removed from the attempt to fulfil these original ideals of system 
and rigour. In his Totality and Infinity of 1961113 we have a prob-
lem and a language which reflect this Heideggerian influence 
 
112 Emmanuel Levinas, Théorie de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de 
Husserl, Paris, 1930. 
113 Totalité et infinie: Essai sur l’exteriorité (Totality and Infinity: An Es-
say on Exteriority), The Hague, 1961. 
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and which evoked rationalistic criticism even on the part of such 
critics as the young Jacques Derrida.114 True, in the change of 
interest and orientation on Levinas’ part, particular and tragic 
causes—the murder of his relatives by the Nazis—played a cru-
cial role. This circumstance, however, does not change the fact 
that the more he became influenced by the later Heidegger, the 
closer he came to a philosophy which exhibits all the basic char-
acteristics of the Brentanian fourth phase, the phase of absolute 
decline. 
The Notion of ‘Infinity’ 
Levinas understands Western philosophy as an attempt to 
grasp in conceptual terms a realm which cannot be so grasped: 
the realm of infinity. The term ‘infinity’ (apeiron) had been 
introduced into Western philosophy by Aristotle who, in the 
Physics, refers to Anaxagoras as one who held infinity to be a 
property of the ‘divine’.115 This notion was taken up by the 
Cappadocian fathers, who understood the term as designating a 
positive attribute of God. Thus, infinity was to be understood on 
the basis of an analogy with our perception of the attributes of 
concrete objects. Due to this analogy, Levinas holds, the genuine 
nature of God was not properly understood in Western 
philosophy and theology. Infinity cannot be grasped, according 
to Levinas, but only accepted. It is not the human subject which 
can initiate a relationship with infinity, but rather the other way 
around: infinity reveals itself to the concrete human being and 
makes the latter able to respond to the self-revelation of the 
former. The form of such a response, however, is not philosophy; 
it is rather what Levinas calls ‘prophetic expression’, either in 
literature or in a confessional framework. If one tries to 
 
114 See his “Violence et métaphysique”, in La voix et la phénomène, Paris, 
1967. 
115 Physics, Book III, Ch. 4. 
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philosophize or grasp infinity philosophically (in the traditional, 
Western sense of the word), one is refusing to fulfill the vocation 
of the human person—that is, to respond to God’s call. As a 
consequence, Levinas considers the entire tradition of Western 
philosophy as a refusal of the initiatives of infinity—as, to put it 
in explicitly religious terms, a denial of divine revelation. In 
other words, Levinas accepts the Heideggerian idea that Western 
philosophy failed in its endeavour to find truth; he insists, 
however, that even Heidegger belongs to the Western 
philosophical tradition and also that the reason for its failure was 
the erroneous conception of infinity derived from the Pre-
Socratics through Christian theology. 
Philosophy and theology have clearly become hopelessly con-
fused in Levinas’ thought. But even more than that, Levinas con-
siders the history of philosophy as the main factor in the history 
of Western civilization, the end of which he sees in contempo-
rary totalitarian political systems. The systematic murder of the 
Jews by the National Socialists is, he holds, just one more con-
sequence of Western civilization and of Western philosophy. 
It is difficult to respond to such a body of philosophical asser-
tions when these are put forward, as they are in Levinas, with so 
little argumentation or attempted justification. One point, how-
ever, must be addressed with care: Levinas’ idea is that the right 
form of philosophy is a kind of prophetic activity which cannot 
be initiated by man, but rather only by infinity or, as Levinas 
explicitly puts it in his later writings, by God. What Levinas is 
getting at here is based on his conviction that infinity, if we un-
derstand this term properly, transcends the realm of man and his 
capacities to a degree that makes every human activity in relation 
to infinity hopeless. This view seems to be problematic even 
from the point of view of a rational theology which seeks to es-
tablish a balanced relation between human freedom and divine 
omnipotence. Divine omnipotence, one could argue, cannot be 
realized if the human agent is eliminated or deprived of his free-
dom. If however freedom is in this sense a presupposition of 
God’s omnipotence, it also follows that the ‘natural’ human fac-
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ulties—and thus the faculty of reason—must possess a greater 
value than is implicitly attributed to it by Levinas.  
If, however, we exaggerate the conception of ‘divine omnipo-
tence’ in our theory, the result is either a quasi-mystical ap-
proach to the problem—which renounces any claim to theoreti-
cal relevance—or sheer irrationalism. Theology is far from im-
plying irrationalism, as is evidently shown by traditional theo-
logical systems in both Western or Eastern cultures which 
demonstrate a certain balance between mystical tenets such as 
‘divine revelation’ on the one hand, and a rational approach, 
embracing logical coherence, on the other.116 Contemporary phi-
losophers of religion, such as Richard Swinburne or Alvin Plant-
inga, are good examples of how theological beliefs and even 
problems of religious mysticism can be treated in a lucidly com-
prehensible fashion.117 Levinas however tends to be irrational-
istic, first, in his poetical language, which he treats as philosoph-
ically relevant. He also presupposes that infinity is so different 
from what is common to human beings that human beings must 
be considered almost nothing in comparison to its richness and 
perfection. 
Levinas’ thinking here is clearly rooted in Heidegger’s notion 
of an ‘ontological difference’. We have already seen that 
 
116 Consider for instance the theological system of Shankara in Hinduism 
which is, like Western Scholasticism, a perfect example of how theological 
rationalism is able to go together with a kind of religious mysticism.  
117 Swinburne, for instance, writes: “It is one of the intellectual tragedies 
of our age that when philosophy in English-speaking countries has developed 
high standards of argument and clear thinking, the style of theological writing 
has been largely influenced by the continental philosophy of Existentialism, 
which, despite its considerable merits, has been distinguished by a very loose 
and sloppy style of argument. If argument has a place in theology, large-scale 
theology needs clear and rigorous argument. That point was very well grasped 
by Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, by Berkeley, Butler, and Paley. It is 
high time for theology to return to their standards.” Richard Swinburne, The 
Coherence of Theism, Oxford: Clarendon, 1977. 
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Heidegger, too, overemphasizes a difference which one might 
otherwise have some reason to accept, the difference between 
being as such and particular existent things. Levinas, however, 
seeks to take the Heideggerian idea to its extreme in order to 
overcome what he considers specifically Heideggerian therein. 
Here again we find the Brentanian pattern of challenge and re-
sponse, and the extreme character of Levinas’ notion of infinity 
becomes even clearer. If infinity infinitely transcends our human 
being, then there is no concept of distance or difference which 
can be legitimately applied to their relationship.118 For in this 
case there is no ground of comparison or commensurability. As 
soon, however, as we speak about both of them together, even in 
terms of a negation of their commensurability, then we tacitly 
acknowledge that there is a kind of commensurability which they 
enjoy.  
This relationship was designated in Scholasticism with refer-
ence to the principle of analogia entis, according to which being 
is predicated of different levels of existence in different senses. 
The being of God is being, as is that of man, yet with the differ-
ence that the being of God is infinite, while the being of man is 
finite. What makes possible the relationship between God and 
man is that both are beings, even if in different senses.  
When Levinas overemphasizes the element of difference to 
the detriment of that of common ground, he commits a logical 
mistake that leads to irrationalism. This irrationalism expresses 
itself in such formulations as: God is transcendent to such a de-
gree that he is ‘absent’119; or: it is in principle impossible to ‘rep-
resent’ God in any sense of the word; or: I too am responsible if I 
am unjustly murdered or persecuted; or: the other person’s ‘oth-
 
118 This is what Philippe Nemo remarks too in his interview with Levinas; 
see Emmanuel Levinas, Ethique et Infini. Dialogues avec Philippe Nemo, 
Paris: Fayard, 1982, p. 104. 
119 See Emmanuel Levinas, Dieu, la Mort et le Temps, Paris: Bernard 
Grasset, 1993, pp. 248 ff. 
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erness’ is radically different from my ‘ownness’ and thus it is 
impossible to understand the other person’s subjectivity on the 
basis of my own.120 Theses of this sort have a long history in 
mystical literature but they are valueless in the context of ration-
al, scientific philosophy. 
An Example of Irrationalism 
Levinas’ irrationalism is even more extreme than that of the 
later Heidegger. For example, Levinas writes in one passage that 
The testimony does not express itself by dialogue, but only in the 
form of the ‘Here I am’ ... It is through this witness that glory be-
comes glorified. This is how Infinity surpasses the finite, and it is 
how Infinity surpasses itself. The ‘saying’ without the ‘what is said’ 
of the witness signifies thus the intrigue of Infinity—intrigue and not 
not experience, intrigue which is not experience.121 
Both the formulation and the content of this passage are at 
first sight quite difficult to understand. Levinas refers first of all 
to the words of Samuel, the one elected by God, who answered 
God’s call with the words ‘Here I am’.122 These words are then 
interpreted as constituting the ideal form of every bearing of wit-
ness to the highest truth, to God, and thus, as can be seen in 
many of Levinas’ writings, they can be seen as the original form 
of philosophy. Third, he identifies this form of philosophy with 
the original form of God’s self-revelation (this is what the word 
‘glory’ refers to).123 
 
120 Ethique et Infini. Dialogues avec Philippe Nemo, op. cit., p. 95. 
121 ‘La témoignage ne s’exprime pas dans ou par un dialogue mais dans la 
formule me voici ... Cest par se témoignage que la gloire se glorifie. Il est la 
façon dont l’Infini se passe. Le Dire sans Dit du témoignage signifie donc 
l’intrigue de l’Infini—intrigue et non pas expérience, intrigue qui n’est pas 
expérience.’ Dieu, la Mort et le Temps, op. cit., p. 227. 
122 See I Sam. 3, 4.  
123 Levinas’ expression of ‘intrigue’ refers, first, to the the theory of ‘nar- 
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Thus, the content of the quotation above is laden with the 
most diverse religious and historical connotations. Yet, as soon 
as the meaning is grasped, we can only wonder why its content 
was not expressed in a more simple and more openly confession-
al language without the pretense of being philosophical. For 
Levinas’ only message is that the transcendence of ‘infinity’ 
(that is: God) must be properly understood. Moreover, he sug-
gests too that philosophy in its original form is a bearing witness 
to God, so that the philosopher in his genuine form is identical 
with the prophet. 
As soon as Levinas’ ideas are clearly formulated, they lose 
their mystical power and attraction. They become matters of re-
ligion. Levinas pretends that he is doing philosophy, although in 
reality he is reformulating religious ideas in a philosophical or 
philosophically-shaded language. Our criticism of Levinas none-
theless can easily serve as the basis for further investigations of 
the influence of Heideggerian thought on contemporary philoso-
phy. As Wolfgang Stegmüller notes, Heidegger introduced a 
philosophical language which might be very interesting and ex-
citing in many ways (his Wortmalerei may be art of high quali-
ty), yet among his followers it led to a ‘negative rhetoric’.124 
That is, authors like Levinas borrowed a certain style from 
Heidegger which is diametrically opposed to the scholarly and 
analytical manner of Brentano or Husserl. This style is not capa-
ble of raising and solving philosophical problems. As Hans Al-
 
rative identity’ in which the subject’s identity, and especially the conscious-
ness of this identity, is defined in terms of his own biography. On the other 
hand, Levinas also refers to the biblical story of Jacob (his name means 
‘trickster’), in which Jacob received the blessing of his father by fraud. The 
etymology of the word ‘intrigue’ refers to the meaning of ‘fraud’ too. In 
Levinas’ interpretation it is precisely through this ‘heavenly fraud’ that God 
reveals himself, by intrigue, so to say, without the interference of the human 
subject.  
124 Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Stuttgart: Alfred 
Kröner Verlag 1989, vol. I.  
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bert points out,125 the purpose of those who use this type of style 
is defensive: they attempt to make their writings and thoughts 
immune to philosophical criticism and testing. This tactic of 
‘immunization’ of one’s philosophy is, according to Albert, the 
most important characteristic of the philosophers working in the 
‘fourth phase’ of the Brentanian schema. 
 
125 Hans Albert, Kritik der reinen Hermeneutik, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 
(Paul Siebeck), 1994. 
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The problems which have appeared during this extension of 
the Brentanian schema turn on the fact that Heidegger’s philoso-
phy clearly contains many original elements that cannot be de-
scribed exclusively in terms of mysticism and decline. As even 
Stegmüller notes, it would be unjust not to notice the richness of 
Heidegger’s many original insights and ideas.126 Just to mention 
one central case: Heidegger’s thinking has recently been shown 
to lead to new possibilities and to new sorts of questioning in the 
field of artificial intelligence through the radical criticism of 
standard theories of representation which it implies.127 The 
Heideggerian philosophy is thus, in a sense, fruitful for current 
scientific research, something that is ruled out for a philosophy 
in the final phase of decline.128 Since, however, our aim here is 
not to formulate an overall evaluation of Heidegger’s philoso-
phy, it is enough that we have successfully shown that the main 
features of this philosophy do indeed coincide with the descrip-
tion of the fourth Brentanian phase. 
The Post-Brentanian Tradition 
We have tried to follow a line in Continental philosophy 
which started with Brentano, was continued by Husserl and by 
the early Heidegger, and has become the source of various con-
temporary schools and trends, many of which show little sympa-
thy to the original Brentanian project of scientific philosophy. 
This line in Continental philosophy is, therefore, not that of the 
‘Brentano school’, even if disciples of Brentano play a central 
 
126 Op. cit., p. 194. 
127 See T. Winograd and F. Flores, Understanding Computers and Cogni-
tion, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley; Karl Leidlmair, Künstliche Intelligenz 
und Heidegger, Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1991, especially p. 30. 
128 Heidegger has exerted an important influence on contemporary theolo-
gy, above all through the work of Bultmann and Rahner; his influence can be 
detected also in psychology (if only through the work of Lacan and others); 
and even in the natural sciences through the work of C. F. von Weizsäcker.  
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role therein. For even the Brentanian ideal of scientific philoso-
phy was not the invention of Brentano himself, but was an idea 
originating in standard nineteenth-century Catholic thought and 
in the Scholastically-inspired logical philosophy of Trendelen-
burg. In the view of Trendelenburg, philosophy is a science, and 
in Brentano’s eyes, the first, flourishing phase of philosophy 
emerges in association with the blossoming of scientific investi-
gation. At the bottom of the final phase of decline are those, such 
as Derrida in our own day, who have embraced a total identifica-
tion of philosophy and literature, of truth and ‘castration’,129 and 
who defend a view to the effect that such binary oppositions are 
in any case the spurious product of the hegemony of ‘phallologo-
centric’ forces.  
 
129 See Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979, pp. 59f. 
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CONCLUSION 
According to Richard Rorty, the only scientifically reliable way 
of writing a history of philosophy is to concentrate on short 
periods in history, such as the one between Descartes and Kant, 
and to point out the development of particular ideas during such 
periods.130 In our application of the Brentanian explanation to 
one of the most important traditions in Continental philosophy in 
our century, we have, in effect, followed Rorty’s rule. We have 
picked out one particular notion in Brentano’s historiography 
and attempted to apply it in the way Brentano would suggest. We 
have therefore considered those figures in Continental 
philosophy who have proven to be most influential. That is, we 
have applied the Brentanian notion in the spirit of the theory of 
ideal types, by interpreting philosophers on the basis of the most 
influential elements of their thought. Although the thinking of 
such philosophers as Heidegger and Levinas certainly possesses 
some complexity, still, they have ineluctably created a 
philosophical atmosphere in which the original Brentanian 
notion of scientific philosophy has completely disappeared. In 
this sense, we are justified in speaking of the decline of a 
philosophical tradition, a decline which has led to a one-sided, 
literary usurpation of philosophy.  
Heidegger’s understanding of the history of philosophy is, in-
deed, expressly decadent. Thus it was easy to show that philo-
 
130 “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres”, in R. Rorty, J. B. 
Schneewind and Q. Skinner, Philosophy of History, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984. 
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sophical method shows a decline in Heidegger’s thought. By this 
means, however, we have only shown that there is at least one 
strand in the history of recent philosophy to which the Brentani-
an explanation can be applied. We have not shown that the 
Brentanian schema has a general validity. The latter has not, 
however, been our purpose, since otherwise we would have had 
to deal also, among other things, with the history of analytic phi-
losophy (from Frege, Moore and Russell on the one hand, to 
Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam on the other), as well as that of 
the so-called ‘realist’ school of phenomenology initiated by 
Reinach and Ingarden and still alive in our day in the work of 
Dallas Willard and others. 
What we have shown is that the Brentanian explanation can 
be applied as a heuristic principle in studies concerning the histo-
ry of philosophy. We have shown, too, that historical concep-
tions which are crudely optimistic and express a belief in a per-
petual development of philosophical learning must be considered 
in a new light. Other conceptions, on the other hand, which de-
clare the ‘end of philosophy’ must be considered critically also. 
The point of the Brentanian conception is precisely that each 
phase of maximal decline has been followed by an ascending 
period in which philosophy served once more as the theoretical 
framework of new and important scientific questions and discov-
eries. 
Brentano’s own idea of the universal theoretical role of phi-
losophy is perhaps somewhat naive. The actual state of the spe-
cial sciences in our day rules out the belief in a philosophy that 
might serve as a single theoretical framework for all the special 
disciplines. This, however, is not among the features which seem 
to be most crucial in the Brentanian schema, and we have not 
committed ourselves to accepting everything which Brentano 
thought to be important in his understanding of philosophy. We 
have wanted to show, rather, how the Brentanian explanation is 
in keeping with historical developments inside one special philo-
sophical tradition —namely in the Continental tradition initiated 
by Brentano himself —a development which does indeed begin 
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with a general theoretical interest so fruitful for scientific devel-
opment, and which ends in a philosophy that loses this theoreti-
cal attitude and dissolves into various kinds of fashionable and 
popular quasi-literary genres.  
The authors of the latter still reserve to themselves the same 
privilege to make general claims as is characteristic of the first, 
ascending phase. For even philosophies which have become 
wholly unscientific still too often insist on telling the ultimate 
truth in matters concerning the entire realm of philosophy. Thus 
we very often find that philosophers on the one hand understand 
philosophy as a kind of literary criticism or ‘critical theory’, yet 
on the other hand take the liberty of expounding radical views on 
the very philosophy which they have rejected. Or, similarly, they 
on the one hand exclude the possibility that truth can be attained 
by philosophical means, and at the same time claim that they are 
in the position of being able to judge the true value of philosoph-
ical systems in the past or in the present. 
Thus Rorty, in his article referred to above, explains that there 
are four kinds of historiographical genre in philosophy. The first, 
which he terms ‘rational reconstruction’, involves that sort of 
approach to the data of the history of philosophy which considers 
questions and problems of the past as if they had been found and 
formulated by contemporary authors. The second, which Rorty 
calls ‘historical reconstruction’, is based on thorough historical 
and exegetical research and seeks to establish the original mean-
ing of philosophical problems born and formulated in the past. 
The third is what Rorty terms Geistesgeschichte. By using this 
German term Rorty wants to convey the idea that there are con-
ceptions of the history of philosophy which consider this history 
in terms of a perpetual development culminating in a given phil-
osophical discovery or system. The fourth type, that of ‘doxog-
raphy’ consists of descriptions of what philosophers in the past 
said or seem to have said. In Rorty’s eyes, however, none of 
these ways can lead to the discovery or solution of genuine phil-
osophical problems for the simple reason that there are no such 
problems.  
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Rorty does not seem to notice that his own approach to the 
history of philosophy constitutes a fifth type, which we might 
call the method of sneering at the past. This amounts to a specific 
sort of theoretical evaluation and classification of various ac-
counts of the history of philosophy. By classifying the possible 
ways of writing the history of philosophy Rorty presupposes the 
very thesis that he at the same time pretends to deny, namely that 
there is a present in which it becomes somehow possible to grasp 
the totality of the history of philosophy and in which it is theoret-
ically possible to evaluate the different accounts of the history of 
philosophy. On the other hand, he does not even try to convince 
his readers that he has good reasons to believe in his own system. 
Thus, his descriptions must, by necessity, remain vague and su-
perficial. They do not help us to clarify what is, in fact, a su-
premely important question: how is it at all possible to write a 
history of philosophy?131 
Brentano’s ideal type explanation is capable of helping us in 
precisely this respect. By hypothetically accepting the Brentani-
an idea of the four phases, we are not practicing a priori histori-
ography. As an ideal type explanation, the Brentanian schema 
helps us to consider concrete developments in the history of phi-
losophy and to establish a certain system or chain of phenomena 
which is structured by principles which can be defined in some 
detail. As we have repeatedly seen, one of the main merits of the 
Brentanian schema is that it breaks both with an unconditionally 
optimistic, and with a similarly pessimistic, view of the history 
of philosophy. It points out, very clearly, that there are particular 
laws in the history of philosophy, the validity of which is, how-
ever, not universal; they are always effective, but only in a lim-
ited sphere. Our task is, on the one hand, to find out what these 
limits are, and, on the other hand, to define the rules which recur, 
 
131 For a detailed criticism of Rorty’s historiography, see Kevin Mulli-
gan’s article, op. cit., section 8 on ‘Anti-Rortyism’. 
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and finally to determine particular states of affairs in the history 
of philosophy.132  
 
132 Work on this volume was supported by the Brentano Foundation and 
by the Research Support Scheme of the Open Society Institute, Prague. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Barry Smith and Balázs M. Mezei 
 
The Four Phases of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
including as an appendix Franz Brentano’s essay: 
 
The Four Phases of Philosophy and its Current State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
forthcoming in the series Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie 
Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi 
 
 
 
Franz Brentano 
 
The Four Phases of Philosophy and its Current State 
 
 
Dedicated to the academic youth of Austria-Hungary in response to so many 
signs of the warmest sympathy. 
 
Foreword 
 
What I offer here is the text of a lecture which I originally delivered at the Literary 
Society in Vienna on the 28th of November, 1894. 
 I was requested to address the association with respect to a book published 
 
2 
by the Literary Society. Anybody who has read H. Lorm’s book on Groundless 
Optimism will not be able to overlook my criticism of each of its central points. 
My lecture, nevertheless, will not be any the less understandable for those who 
have not read the book. The lecture is self-contained. 
 My text, as will become clear, touches upon the most important 
philosophical questions of our day. The novelty of the conception of the history of 
philosophy which it contains might surprise some of my hearers. For me, however, 
this conception has stood the test of time over many years. It has been 
presupposed by me, as by students of my academic lectures on the history of 
philosophy, for more than twenty years. I do not delude myself into believing that 
the conception will not face opposition; on the contrary, I am quite certain that the 
opposition against it might be so strong that it will take some time to defeat it. I 
hope, nevertheless, that the facts and considerations I present to you will leave an 
impression on the part of those who follow my lecture carefully. 
 I have tried to make the text as easily comprehensible as possible. The short 
notes are designed to make the chronological order clear for all who are less 
familiar with the history of philosophy.  
 In addition, one thing must be noted. It would be a fatal misunderstanding if 
anybody were to think that I deny the unusual talents of those epoch-making 
philosophers whom I cannot consider to have made real contributions to the 
advancement of philosophy. I agree with Schopenhauer in his judgment as to the 
scientific value of the Hegelian system; I cannot, however, consent to his contempt 
for the intellectual capacity of the man. One should especially not misinterpret my 
real opinion of Kant’s philosophy in those passages in which I deal with this 
extraordinary thinker. Independently of what I say of his philosophical system, his 
achievements for the natural sciences, like those of Proclus for mathematics, 
remain untouched.  
 
Franz Brentano 
Vienna, 18 January 1895. 
 
 
 
Highly esteemed assembly! 
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 1. Hieronymus Lorm has written a book, entitled Groundless Optimism1, 
which deals with the most important philosophical questions. The Literary Society 
in Vienna has published this book, and wishes now that I speak about it to you. 
 There is always something awkward in a single lecture on philosophy that is 
not addressed exclusively to specialists. One is forced to isolate aspects that are in 
fact connected to one another in manifold ways. What is of most lively interest is 
usually not what is most easily accessible to the general public. What is most 
easily accessible are, obviously, the elementary questions of philosophy. In the 
book before us, however, the views put forward are opaque and turgid. From the 
start it leaves us in the dark as to how we shall arrive at the most important 
questions, and, if I were simply to dwell on the subjects of the book I would fall 
into the worst mistake: I would become boring. On this occasion, moreover, it was 
not even left open to me to select one of those elementary questions as my topic, 
since I was called upon to consider Lorm’s book, and thus the field from which I 
had to choose was in a way limited.  
 In spite of all this, I have accepted your invitation. The Literary Society has 
published a serious work on philosophy. By this, it convincingly bears witness 
against those who declare the general interest in philosophy extinct.2 That is an act 
indeed that deserves recognition and gratitude.3 
                                                          
1 Hieronymus Lorm, Der grundlose Optimismus-Ein Buch der Betrachtung, Vienna, 
Verlag der literarischen Gesellschaft, 1894. 
 
2 See the third paragraph of its Statute: ‘The Society publishes works in literature as well as 
scientific works of general interest.’ During the first year of its existence (1894), the Society 
published five books: three were literary works, one work was on science, and the one by H. 
Lorm concerns philosophy. 
 
3 In my original lecture, the following passage was inserted: ‘I shall perhaps never have the 
opportunity to speak again to my dear Viennese friends who kindly accepted me into their 
company twenty years ago and have shown since then so many signs of warmest benevolence. 
The time of my activity at the University was intolerantly shortened by Minister Taafe, and the 
situation became even worse when the Ministry of Education was taken over by Hohenwart—I 
mean of course the Ministry of Education that was reorganized by Windischgrätz under the 
strong influence of Hohenwart. Expressing my opinion to Herr von Madeisky I pointed out that 
the rights earned by all the years of my work under one Ministry cannot be revoked by such a 
change of office. In his answer Herr von Madeisky informed me that he could not share my view. 
Understandably, what I strongly wish now is a free atmosphere. My lecture here can be seen as a 
sort of Last Supper. which I celebrate, for the last time, together with my friends in Vienna.’ My 
words, which were followed by a long and cold silence on the part of the audience, stired a strong 
reaction in the public. Finally, I felt necessary to make some comments both on my words and on 
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 2. Lorm’s book has some outstanding characteristics. The author’s 
openheartedness is mirrored in his work, which is full of observations in part wise 
and stimulating, in part vivid and astute. Lorm addresses the criticisms of others, 
and he evaluates in detail both current circumstances and the historical 
development leading to the present situation in philosophy.  
 His statements do not lack originality, but the strongly emphasized 
subjective peculiarities of his views make their general validity questionable. At 
the same time, Lorm proves to be more or less a man of his age. The pessimistic 
tendency of the time in which we live is already shown by his choice of subject. 
His deep respect for Kant, too, is characteristic of our day. Lorm’s reverence, 
indeed, is differentiated in the way that is nowadays all too common: on the one 
hand, he celebrates Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and takes it as an established 
starting point of any future investigation; but on the other hand he rejects the 
Critique of Practical Reason as completely untenable and ‘frail’.  
 As already mentioned, Lorm makes a great effort to throw light on the 
present situation in philosophy as well as on its prehistory. Thus I find it 
appropriate to do the same. This seems to be more sensible than discussing the 
rather strange attitude which Lorm calls ‘groundless optimism’. For, as even Lorm 
writes at the end of his book: ‘My investigations are ... for individuals only. They 
are not addressed to groups, nor to the collective reason of clubs and 
associations.’4 So Lorm’s book is apparently not directed, either, at the collective 
reason of the Literary Association in Vienna, which published the book.  
 3. The history of philosophy is a history of scientific efforts, and it is thus 
similar in some respects to the history of the other sciences. On the other hand, it 
is different from the latter and seems rather to be analogous to the history of the 
fine arts. Other sciences, as long as scientists pursue them, show a constant 
development which may sometimes be interrupted by periods of stagnation. 
Philosophy, however, like the history of the fine arts, has always had periods of 
ascending development and, on the other hand, periods of decadence. The latter 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the circumstances which provoked them in a series of articles *see the Neue Freie Presse of 2, 5, 
8, 15, 18 December 1894). Since the problem has nothing to do with the questions addressed in 
my lecture, I eliminated my arguments from the published version of the main text. At the same 
time, I reintroduced them in a footnote in order to prevent anybody who heard my lecture from 
misunderstanding me, or from thinking that I believe that what I said was impertinent. 
 
4 Hieronymus Lorm, Der grundlose Optimismus, p. 328. 
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are, nonetheless, often no less rich, are indeed richer in epoch-making phenomena, 
than are the healthy and productive periods. In the succession of these periods, a 
certain regularity can be found. Just as the periods of development and decline in 
the history of the fine arts display certain common features and analogies, so the 
three great periods of Western philosophy run in an essentially analogous way.  
 In the periods of antiquity, in the Middle Ages, and in the  modern period up 
to the collapse of the Hegelian school, four stages can be distinguished in each 
case. These stages are in many ways different from one another, yet they are at the 
same time internally related to the extent that their similarity, once recognized, is 
unmistakable. Moreover, quite simple considerations in cultural psychology can 
make this remarkable correspondence fully comprehensible.  
 The first phase covers the whole ascending development. Its beginning is in 
each case characterized in a twofold way:  
 – on the one hand through a lively and pure theoretical interest. As already 
Plato and Aristotle rightly noted, it was through wonder that mankind was 
motivated to philosophical investigations. 
 – on the other hand it is marked by a method that is essentially appropriate 
to nature (even if in its early forms it is still rather primitive). It was through the 
aid of this method that science developed, partly through perfecting hypotheses, 
partly by an enlargement of the scope of investigation and partly through 
confronting new questions.  
 The second phase is in fact the first stage of decline. It is initiated in each 
case by the weakening or distortion of scientific interest. From this time on it is 
practical motives by which investigations are primarily determined. Accordingly, 
theoretical interest is pursued less rigorously and less conscientiously. Ideas of 
power and depth are lacking, and even if a certain breadth, as opposed to depth, is 
thereby gained, and wider circles become interested in the popularized doctrines of 
a philosophical sect, still, all this is no true substitute for genuine scientific 
activity. 
 Under such deteriorated circumstances, a kind of spiritual revolution breaks 
out, which constitutes the second stage of decline. This is the time of 
predominating skepticism. Science has become unscientific and has thereby made 
itself unworthy of trust; this trust is accordingly withdrawn. Moreover, it is now 
generally denied that reason is capable of any sort of secure knowledge, or it is 
held that such a capacity is restricted to the most miserable remnants.  
 Skepticism, however, is not something which can satisfy the longings of 
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mankind. As Aristotle states in the famous first sentence of his Metaphysics, ‘All 
men by nature desire to know.’ The natural longing after truth, when once it has 
been challenged by skepticism, forces its way through with violence. With 
pathologically intensified enthusiasm people start once more to construct 
philosophical dogmas. In addition to the natural means employed in the first 
phase, however, they now invent entirely unnatural means of gaining knowledge 
on the basis of ‘principles’ lacking in all insight, ingenious ‘directly intuitive’ 
powers, mystical intensifications of the mental life–so that very soon people 
suppose themselves to be in possession of the most exalted truths that are beyond 
all human powers. 
 The period of decline thereby reaches its extreme point. The contrast to the 
conditions which led to the first flourishing of philosophical research could not be 
more blatant. One claims to know everything, yet in fact knows nothing. For one 
no longer knows even the one truth that one had known with longing and suffering 
at the beginning of the first period: namely that one knows nothing.  
 4. Let us start with the period of antiquity in order to see whether its history 
in fact corresponds to our scheme. 
 Greek philosophy emerged with the philosophy of nature of the Ionian 
thinkers. It is quite easy to see how wonder at the riddle of the universe here gave 
rise to the most intense drive for knowledge. When Anaxagoras, one of the 
greatest of the Ionians, first neglected the care of his property and was scolded for 
this by his relatives, he simply renounced his entire fortune in order to live 
unencumbered for philosophical research. He did not even want to make use of the 
political privileges of his aristocratic rank, and he quite decidedly refused to take 
part in the government of his home city. As he said, ‘the heavens are my 
homeland, and my destiny is the examination of the stars.’ 
 In addition to their lively and pure theoretical interest these earliest Hellenes 
possessed a kind of natural method too. This might sound surprising, since there 
are many today–even Comte has lent support to this prejudice–who think that 
mankind at first proceeded in ways entirely contrary to the things of nature, and 
that they discovered the appropriate means of investigation only much later. The 
childhood of mankind, however, was very similar to the childhood of each 
individual. It was Lavoisier5 who drew attention to the rapidity with which 
                                                          
5 A. L. Lavoisier, Traité élémentaire de chimie, Paris 1789. Part One, Discours 
préliminaire, Paris 1789, p. VIII. 
 
 
7 
children quickly proceed from one discovery to the next, led by nature herself in 
finding the right mode of investigation. Anyone who takes in his hands Theodor 
Gomperz’s new work6 on the ancient Greek philosophers-a book so much admired 
by Billroth7-can easily convince himself that my acknowledgment of the merits of 
the ancient Ionian philosophers is not the least bit undeserved.  
 It was through this kind of interest and method that Greek philosophy 
developed. Its hypotheses were gradually deepened, its questions multiplied and 
became more complex, and finally wide-ranging theoretical systems were 
constructed. After only three hundred years,8 an achievement as scientifically 
important as the philosophy of Aristotle had become possible.  
 Aristotle’s work was, however, also the last momentous product in the 
ascending stage of ancient philosophy. Immediately after him there began the first 
stage of decline as, quite clearly, the theoretical interest gave way to the practical 
one.  
 5. The whole of Greek culture was at that time in a state of dissolution. 
Belief in popular religion was at an end, and the authority of the age-old political 
institutions had collapsed. Philosophy was called in aid, not only in relation to 
theoretical needs, but also, and to a much greater extent, from a practical point of 
view.  
 The Stoa9 and Epicurianism10 are the two schools which, through their 
one-sided practical orientation, represent this first stage of decline in antiquity. 
Both saw their doctrine as being divided into three parts: ethics, logic, and 
physics. Logic and physics however enjoyed only a miserably down-trodden 
existence as the servants of ethics. As a consequence, ethics, too, lost in scientific 
value. This was only natural, because without a deeper investigation of human 
nature one will achieve no clarity regarding either man’s task or the ways in which 
                                                          
6 Theodor Gomperz, Griechische Denker. Eine Geschichte der antiken Philosophie, 
Leipzig 1894. 
 
7 In a letter to the editor in Neue Freie Presse, 11 February, 1894. 
 
8 From Thales (born c. 640 BC) to Aristotle (died 322 BC). 
 
9 The Stoa was founded by Zeno in about 308 BC and developed by Chrysippus (282-209 
BC). 
 
10 Epicurus lived between 341 and 270 BC. 
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this can be fulfilled.  
 As the school became less profound, so its breadth increased. Epicurus had 
incomparably more followers than did Plato or Aristotle. And even if there were 
among them none who could develop the Epicurean teaching in a scientific way, 
still, one of the disciples of Epicurus was a poetical genius11 unparalleled either in 
the Platonic or–if we do not count the author of the Divine Comedy–in the 
Peripatetic philosophy.  
 6. There followed then the second stage of decline, that of skepticism. 
Skepticism appeared in a two-fold form in the history of antiquity. The weaker 
form is that of the New Academy.12 According to its representatives, we can 
achieve only probability, and there is no aim in relation to which there is attainable 
that sort of certainty which definitively excludes the possibility of error. The 
strong form of skepticism is what is now called Pyrrhonism, whose founder Pyrrho 
flourished in the time of Alexander the Great. Initially, his activity gave rise to a 
greater degree of aversion than of acceptance. This situation changed, however, as 
soon as the dogmatism of the Stoics and the Epicureans began to go downhill. 
Aenesidemus13, Agrippa14 and Sextus Empiricus,15 the main representatives of the 
school, lived in this period.  
 Besides weak and strong skepticism we should mention also the school of 
Eclecticism, whose representatives allowed themselves the luxury of taking over 
or refusing anything they liked from the various competing schools. Thus they 
never arrived at any firm convictions of their own. Cicero, their most important 
representative,16 explicitly considered his position as closely related to the 
skepticism of the New Academy.  
 Epicureanism and Stoicism, especially in their later development, became 
more and more imbued by eclecticism. If we consider this fact, we can understand, 
                                                          
11 T. Lucretius Carus, fl. 95-92 BC. 
 
12 Carneades, the founder of the New (or Third) Academy, lived between 214 and 129 in 
Athens. 
 
13 Aenesidemus taught in Alexandria at about the time of Christ’s birth. 
 
14 Agrippa lived some time between Aenesiades and Sextus Empiricus. 
 
15 Sextus Empiricus lived about 200 BC. 
 
16 M. Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC). 
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too, why all the philosophical schools at that time were infected by a kind of 
skeptical mood, and why whole groups in society were seized by this attitude also. 
When Jesus declared to Pilate that he came into the world in order to bear witness 
to the truth, Pilate responded with a skeptical question: ‘What is truth?’ 
 7. Skepticism, however, was not the last stage in the history of ancient 
philosophy. Rather it was followed by the most violent conceivable reaction. To 
this belong the group associated with the Jewish Platonists17 and the neo-
Pythagoreans,18 whose work helped to build the third stage in the decline of 
ancient philosophy. By far the most important phenomenon in this class, however, 
was that of neo-Platonism which swoops around and preens itself in the world of 
‘intelligible entities’. Ammonius Saccas,19 Plotinus,20 Porphyrius,21 Iamblichus,22 
Proclus,23 and many others were leaders of their respective schools, who were not 
only celebrated but even feared as Gods. In place of the absent knowledge of the 
laws of the natural sciences, Proclus and others employed the artificial lawfulness 
of a triadic system.  
 This much may suffice to establish our law of the four phases in relation to 
the history of ancient philosophy.  
 8. Let us turn to the Middle Ages. 
 The very same drama is played out in this period. The partly Germanized 
peoples of the Occident showed themselves very early to have been, like the 
Arabs, affected by the most intense drive for knowledge. Very early on they had 
established who among the ancient thinkers was the true master of knowledge. 
Even though the ignorance of the Greek language made their task all the more 
                                                          
17 Philo Judaeus, fl. 39 AD in Alexandria. 
 
18 The most important representatives of neo-Pythagorianism were Apollonius of Tyana, 
Moderatus of Gades (both lived under Nero), and Nicomachus of Gerasa (who lived in the time 
of the Antonii). 
 
19 Ammonius Saccas (c. 175-250 AC). 
 
20 Plotinus (205-270). 
 
21 Porphyrius (233-c. 304). 
 
22 Iamblichus died under the rule of Constantine the Great. 
 
23 Proclus (411-485). 
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difficult, the Scholastic thinkers agreed in a relatively short time24 on a common 
and surprisingly correct understanding of the works of Aristotle. Neither 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, nor Simplicius had understood Aristotle even to a small 
degree so perfectly as did Thomas Aquinas, the great teacher of the thirteenth 
century.25 This would have been impossible without a certain congeniality of 
mind, something which Thomas held on to not only in other writings, but also and 
especially in his De regime principum, a work most famous and so advanced for 
political philosophy. What further progress one could then have hoped for! 
 9. But look: immediately after Thomas the philosophy of the Middle Ages 
begins to decline. It is easy to see that the reason for this was the weakening and 
distortion of the pure scientific interest.  
 The most important scholars of philosophy in the Middle Ages belonged to 
one or other of the two large mendicant orders, the Dominican and the Franciscan. 
Highly esteemed authorities had been brought forward by both. The two 
Dominicans Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas put all the achievements of the 
Franciscans into the shade. This awakened not inconsiderable jealousy among the 
latter. And when the Franciscans, in turn, recognized a forceful and productive 
writer in Duns Scotus,26 they raised up their banners behind him as their leader. 
Just as the Franciscans committed themselves to the teaching of Duns Scotus, so 
the Dominicans committed themselves to that of Thomas Aquinas. The love of 
truth and wisdom now degenerated into pure opinionatedness. All observation and 
conscientious consideration of contrary facts waned. Even well-founded 
objections were killed off dialectically by a kind of over-subtlety and by a 
ceaseless drawing of senseless distinctions. Thus, in addition to the two traditional 
kinds of distinction, real and conceptual, Duns Scotus invented a third kind, which 
he called the formal. This was supposed to be ‘smaller’ than the real, and ‘greater’ 
than the conceptual distinction, and since no clear definition was given, this third 
kind of distinction was all the more easily able to serve as the subject of empty 
verbal squabbles.27  
                                                          
24 Alexander of Hales was the first of the Scholastics who knew all the works of Aristotle 
(before him only the texts on logic were known). He died in 1245. 
 
25 Thomas Aquinas (1227 [sic]-1274). 
 
26 John Duns Scotus (1274 [sic]-1308). 
 
27 It is easy to understand what the expressions ‘real difference’ and ‘conceptual difference’ 
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 The obsession with disputation became ever more absurd. As a sign of this, 
the Scotist Franciscus Marionis introduced what was called the great actus 
Sorbonnicus at Paris,28 a truly cruel torment. The poor disputee was obliged to 
defend his position for a full twelve hours (except for a short break for lunch) 
against anybody who threw down a challenge. That Scholastic thinking still today 
has a bad reputation as a kind of hair-splitting is due to the influence of this time, 
which we can call the Scotist period. 
 10. This, then, was the first stage of decline, which led, in consequence, to 
the second, the stage of skepticism. This was represented in the Middle Ages by 
nominalism, whose revolutionary and skeptical character has often been noted. 
William of Ockham29 not only rejected the reality of universals; he argued, too, 
that all our ideas are only signs. Just as smoke, as the sign of fire, has no similarity 
to the fire, so too our ideas, he argued, have no similarity to their objects. With 
respect to the most exalted questions he stated that rational knowledge of God, as 
a knowing, creating and infinite being, is impossible. Similarly, we cannot know 
whether there is something spiritual and immortal in man. Accordingly, there is no 
such thing as natural morality. For God can command as he wishes. He can 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mean. X is in reality different from Y inasmuch as X is always X, and X can be legitimately 
denied to be Y. X, however, is different conceptually from Y inasmuch as X is always X, and the 
concept of X can be legitimately denied to be the concept of Y. Two human beings are different 
in reality; a musician and a painter are also conceptually different.  
 It is easy to recognize that if any two things are different conceptually, they can be the 
same in reality. A musician can at the same time be a painter. It is equally easy to see that, if any 
two things are different in reality, they can be the same conceptually: for instance, Bismarck and 
Caprivi as statesmen both fall under the same concept. It is therefore inappropriate to say that 
real distinctions are ‘greater’ than conceptual distinctions; neither of them includes the other, 
they are fully disparate. It is even more absurd to introduce a ‘formal distinction’ as possessing 
some ‘middle greatness’ between the real and the conceptual. 
 Scotus applied his formal distinction to the highest mysteries of theology. The difference 
between the three divine persons is neither real, nor conceptual he held; rather they are formally 
different. And since the meaning of ‘formal distinction’ remained unclear, such statements could 
not be proved to be contrary to the orthodox teachings of the Church. 
 
28 Franciscus Marionis (with the title ‘magister abstractionum’) died in 1325. In 1315, he 
introduced the Great Sorbonnian Act, which took place every week from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. during 
the whole summer, and was devoted to dialectical debates. 
 
29 William of Ockham, the most important representative of nominalism in the 14th century, 
defended Ludwig the Bavarian against the Holy See. He died in 1343 (or 1347) in Munich. 
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command lies just as well as truth; the breaking up of marriage just as well as 
faithfulness; murder just as well as the love of our neighbor; he could even 
command us to hate God himself, and in this case even this would beg merit.  
 In the Middle Ages, the authority of the Church was still very powerful, and 
it was able to inhibit such skeptical tendencies. On the other hand, the nominalists 
tried to shirk this control. In order to achieve their aims, they declared flatteringly 
that what they said had nothing to do with the teachings of the Church. They 
argued that the teachings of the Church were theologically true; but on the other 
hand they considered it necessary to point out that, philosophically, the same 
teachings were just as decidedly false. By affirming that the same proposition can 
be true and false at the same time, the very essence of truth was completely 
destroyed.  
 11. There arose a new and powerful reaction to these skeptical tendencies 
towards the end of the Middle Ages. 
 As is known, numerous mystical thinkers of great prominence appeared in 
this period. These included Meister Eckhardt,30 John Tauler,31 Henry Suso,32 John 
Ruysbroek,33 and the author of the Theologia Teutonica which was edited by 
Luther.34 Chancellor Gerson,35 who presided over the Council at Constance as the 
most important man of his time, is rightly counted as a mystic.  
 And in addition to religious mysticism we find philosophical speculations 
which seek, via a new and unnatural method, never before heard of, to rise up in a 
soaring flight to the highest peaks of truth. I mention here only the followers of 
Lull on the one hand, and the famous German Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa on the 
other. 
 Raymundus Lullus,36 a noble yet visionary man, lived as early as the 
                                                          
30 Meister Eckhardt died in 1329. 
 
31 Johannes Tauler died in 1361. 
 
32 Henry Suso (beatified by the Church) died in 1365. 
 
33 John Ruysbroek died in 1381. 
 
34 The author of the Theologia Teutonica remains unknown. 
 
35 John Gerson (1363-1429). 
 
36 Raymundus Lullus (1235-1315). The first papal condemnation of his writings was issued 
in 1376. 
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thirteenth century in Spain. His own newly invented logical method he called the 
ars magna. He assembled a device of concentrically connected disks, on each of 
which he had written different words, which displayed the richest variety of 
combinations. It is hard to see how nature could be made to give up her secrets in 
this way. Lull, however, expected the utmost from this invention which he seems 
to have considered to have been given to him from God himself. Thus he bravely 
set out to demonstrate apodictically, from reason alone, the necessary character of 
the Divine Trinity, original sin, incarnation, and the Saviour’s death. This 
eccentric man did not find many followers among his contemporaries. In the 14th 
century, however, the number of Lullists had grown so much that the University of 
Paris, under the leadership of Gerson, found it necessary to condemn Lull ‘grand 
art’. The Lullists showed an immense respect for the writings of their master. As 
they said, the Old Testament came from the Father, the New Testament from the 
Son, and Lullus’ teaching from the Holy Spirit. This teaching, they argued, could 
not be investigated reflectively, nor could it be learned. The only way to 
understand it would be through a sublime form of inspiration. The number of the 
followers of Lullus was so high even at the time of the Reformation (Giordano 
Bruno had the highest opinion of the wisdom of Lull) that Pope Paul IV, like 
Gregory XI before him, condemned and banned his writings.  
 The wild ambition of many in the field of speculation that is so 
characteristic of that age as opposed to what preceded it, is even more clearly 
reflected in the works of Nicholas of Cusa,37 whose views helped to determine 
Giordano Bruno’s opinion of Lullus. Nicholas of Cusa employed the name docta 
ignorantia, ‘learned ignorance’, for his own teaching, by which he meant a kind of 
ignorance that went beyond all forms of knowledge. He called this ignorance 
‘seeing without comprehension’, or ‘incomprehensible comprehension’, 
‘speculation’, ‘intuition’, ‘mystical theology’, ‘third heaven’, ‘wisdom’ and so 
forth. The lowest form of knowledge is sensation (sensus). A higher form is that of 
reason (ratio). The third and by far the most sublime form of our spiritual faculties 
is intellectual insight (intellectus). While sensation knows things by affirmation, 
and reason by affirmation and negation, the knowledge given in intellectual 
insight is gained exclusively by negation. In the field of the intellect, the law of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
37 Nicholas of Cusa (born in Kues at Trier, was Bishop of Brixen, lived between 
1401-1464). 
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contradiction does not hold. On the contrary, the intellect is the principle of the 
coincidence of opposites.38 Through this super-rational and wild manner of 
reasoning, the knowledge of God, of the creation, and of the unity of God and 
creation, are then constructed in a priori fashion.39 
 In the present context, regrettably, I cannot go into more detail with respect 
to this last original speculative system of the Middle Ages. I believe nevertheless 
that the little that has been said suffices to show that this system, like the 
speculations of the neo-Pythagoreans and the Neoplatonists in antiquity, fits well 
with my general characterization of the fourth stage in the history of philosophy. 
 Let us turn directly to the modern age.  
 12. The third period emerges with Francis Bacon and Descartes.40 
 The powerful yet unmingled desire for knowledge characteristic of this 
period is well enough known. Thus the old claim to a natural method returned in 
an obvious form. Experience was celebrated as the great master of knowledge. The 
inductive mode of investigation has ever since remained firmly connected to the 
name of Bacon. Similarly, Descartes, too, turned to the observation of facts. It is 
said that someone once asked Descartes to show him his library. Descartes opened 
the door of a storeroom, in which no book was to be seen. Instead, there was a 
slaughtered calf hanging on the wall, used by Descartes for his investigations in 
physiology and psychology. Descartes told his visitor: ‘Here is my library, from 
                                                          
38 Nicholas of Cusa explained his principle of ‘coincidentia oppositorum’ by mathematical 
examples. A straight line on the one hand, and a curve, say, of a circle on the other, are contrary 
to one another; yet, an infinite circle is identical to an infinite straight line. A bevel is contrary to 
an acute angle; on the other hand, the extreme points of a bevel or an acute angle, as he held, are 
the same, since the two sides of the angle make a straight line. 
 
39 Despite the gap between the thought of Nicholas of Cusa and that of Hegel, a certain 
analogy between the two systems is unmistakable. A third element appears in both systems as the 
unity of the two previous ones. One should recall, too, the way in which Hegel changes the 
principle of contradiction into its opposite, and also the importance attributed to the principle of 
negation in his speculative processes. 
 
40 Francis Bacon (1561-1626); Descartes (1596-1650). One could mention in this context 
also Galileo (1564-1642), though it seems to me that he was not so influential in philosophy. The 
reason may have been that Italy did not play an essential role in the philosophical discussions of 
that time. Be this as it may, the consideration of Galileo’s work would not change in the least 
what I have outlined with respect to the characteristic elements of the initial stages of the 
ascending periods in philosophy. 
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which I take my wisdom.’ 
 The followers of Bacon and Descartes remained faithful to the method of 
experience. With the help of this method, Locke41 achieved genuine results which 
have been considered as valid ever since. Leibniz,42 too, arrived at a variety of 
important psychological insights. The dissipation of his efforts in many areas, 
however, hindered him in concentrating his extraordinary talents entirely on 
philosophy.  
 13. But just as in antiquity, so in the modern period too after a long, 
ascending phase new developments disturbed the scene.  
 The setting was in fact in many ways similar to the start of the period of 
decadence in Greece. Popular religion no longer had the same impact on people as 
it had had earlier, and in politics, too, everything traditional began to waver. 
Philosophy, again, was called upon to render her assistance, so that the pure 
theoretical interest was replaced by a practical one. This led to the same outcome 
as in antiquity. Philosophy became superficial, and in spite of the growing number 
of people interested in philosophy, its scientific significance began to ebb.  
 Both the French and the German Enlightenment, for all their differences, 
show clearly the correctness of what I have said. The former can be characterized 
as a kind of simplification of the philosophy of Locke,43 the latter as a 
simplification of Leibnizian44 thought. Hume45 called attention to the fact that, 
from a certain point in time, nobody read the writings of Locke, and public 
opinion was shaped by superficial philosophical writers.  
 14. And so the first stage of the declining period began. It was directly 
followed by the second, that of skepticism.  
                                                          
41 John Locke (1632-1704) is considered even now as the most important founder of 
analytical psychology. 
 
42 G. W. Leibniz (1646 [sic]-1716). 
 
43 Voltaire (1694-1778) was the most important among those who transplanted Lockean 
philosophy onto French soil. 
 
44 Already one can say of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) that he had watered down the 
Leibnizian philosophy. His school dominated the German Enlightenment. Lessing (1729-1781), 
by reinterpreting the doctrine of the Trinity, was known as a follower of Spinoza. In other 
philosophical respects, however, as is today fully clear, he allied himself with Leibniz. 
 
45 David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 1. 
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 The most important representative of this stage in the third great period of 
the history of philosophy was David Hume.46 This is too well known that it would 
be necessary to demonstrate it by talking about his views in detail. It is known, 
similarly, that the sting of his skepticism caused pain not only in England, but also 
in Germany which had in the meantime become, alongside England, the most 
fertile land for the cultivation of philosophical ideas. As Kant said, it was Hume 
who awakened him from out of his dogmatic slumbers. 
 15. But now look: as the most powerful response to such skepticism there 
follows again, a reaction which seeks to rescue and advance knowledge by 
unheard of and unnatural means. 
 In England, this reaction took place in the work of the so-called Scottish 
School, a group of philosophers that is much too little known in Germany today. 
Its founder was Thomas Reid47 who claimed that a sum of elementary judgments 
could be found in the mind of each of us. We are certain that they are true, 
although we do not have any evidence for them. Reid called this sum of 
elementary judgments ‘common sense’. It is possible that we are wrong about their 
truth, but we have to believe them in any case; furthermore we can use them as the 
basis of a science. Only in this way can skepticism be overcome.  
 In Germany, it was Kant48 who undertook to save knowledge from Hume’s 
skepticism, and his method was in essence very similar to that of Reid. Kant 
claimed that science demands as its foundation a number of principles which he 
called synthetic a priori judgments. On close inspection of what he means by this, 
however, it turns out that the term a priori amounts for him to propositions that 
stand for us as true from the beginning without their being evident.49 The sum of a 
priori judgments have the same character as Reid’s judgments of common sense.  
 Now, however, Kant introduces something that is characteristic of him 
alone. While Reid did not try in the least to gloss over the obvious irrationality of 
                                                          
46 David Hume (1711-1776). In modern times, just as in antiquity, in addition to scepticism 
a sort of eclecticism appeared, which was marked by a kind of sceptical uncertainty. 
 
47 Thomas Reid (1710-1796) was the first of the philosophers of the Scottish School. His 
most important followers were: Dugald Stewart (1753-1828); Thomas Brown (1778-1820), and 
Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856). 
 
48 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). 
 
49 See Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, A 153-155 [note by O. Kraus]. 
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his demand to build knowledge on blind prejudices, Kant endeavors to find a 
means by which such an apparently absurd procedure can be justified. As he 
concludes, grounding knowledge on blind prejudices could be permitted only on 
one condition: namely if we can assume that the objects adjust themselves to these 
prejudices.50 This assumption must therefore be made. While, as Kant says, people 
had hitherto believed that our knowledge followed the things, we must now 
assume that the things bend themselves to our knowledge. On the basis of the 
earlier assumption, skepticism could not be overcome. By using synthetic a priori 
judgments, however, skepticism can be victoriously repelled.  
 Now all of this would be fine, were it not for the fact that, of the two 
assumptions, only one seems to be in accordance with nature; the second, on the 
other hand, is clearly an unnatural and silly claim. 
 Yet Kant makes every effort to make it more plausible, by alluding to the 
fact that the one group of objects to which our investigations are directed–namely 
the sum of all objects of experience–is phenomenal. Phenomena are co-determined 
by our subjectivity. Synthetic a priori knowledge is thus to refer exclusively to 
this group of objects; beyond phenomena, and beyond the field of possible 
experience, knowledge is supposed to be absolutely impossible. Accordingly, for 
Kant as for Hume, any investigation of the most exalted philosophical questions is 
ruled out. We can gain no secure knowledge of God, immortality, freedom; we 
simply cannot know, however much we thirst for this knowledge, whether there 
was a beginning of the world, whether the universe is bounded or unbounded, etc.  
 Kant’s attempt to grab back the booty from skepticism was thus only a very 
partial success-if it was a success at all. For in actuality Kant’s position must be 
plainly denied. Admittedly, objects, inasmuch as they are our phenomena, are 
somehow co-determined in their peculiarity by subjectivity. By saying this, 
however, it has not at all been shown that any old blind prejudice which we may 
have would prove itself in application to the course these objects take. If we 
assume that objects are determined by our prejudices willy nilly, then we assume 
something logically inadmissible, and if we want to base a science on such an 
assumption, then the old charge of skepticism concerning the arbitrariness of 
principles applies with full force.  
                                                          
50 Ueberweg, too, calls the synthetic judgements ‘a priori prejudices’. Brentano’s charge, 
however, is not that these judgements are a priori, but rather that, for Kant, their correctness 
cannot be proved [note by O. Kraus]. 
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 Kant, however, did not become conscious of this weakness in his 
philosophy. What caused him concern, was not doubt as to phenomena, but rather 
the awareness that he had to sacrifice to the skeptics the best and most exalted part 
of knowledge. Thus, he thinks up a new sort of substitute. While synthetic a priori 
knowledge is a matter of what we must blindly accept, so the existence of God, the 
immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will are a matter of what we should 
believe. They are ‘postulates of pure practical reason’. We possess no sort of 
evidence into their truth, but this should not make our conviction of their validity 
any weaker. I shall hold fast to them, with no less force than to my own moral 
dignity. And thus Kant flattered himself that he had established certainty as to the 
objective reality of these exalted ideas.  
 Nicholas of Cusa, as we have seen, attributed a kind of ‘incomprehensible 
comprehension’ to his ‘intellectus’. Similarly, it seems to me, Kant presumed for 
his practical reason a sort of ‘unbelieving belief’. Everything that he brought 
forward in order to overcome skepticism is just as contrary to nature and as 
eccentric as was every previous case of reaction against the second stage of the 
period of decline.  
 In Germany, however, Kant’s philosophy was only the beginning of this 
reaction to skepticism. While the more sober-minded English philosophers did not 
go further along the road upon which Reid had set out, and indeed in the Scottish 
school itself Thomas Brown,51 the successor of Reid, returned to a more natural 
mode of consideration, Kant was followed in Germany by Fichte52 with his 
method of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Fichte, in turn, was followed by 
Schelling53 with his ‘intellectual insight’ that is supposed to be a type of absolute 
knowledge in and of itself: it cannot be taught, nor is it clear why philosophy 
should be obligated to pay special attention to any such monstrous power. Indeed, 
one is supposed to infer the mode of access to it from our common knowledge, 
even though no connection at all exists between them. Schelling was followed by 
Hegel54 with his philosophy of the absolute, which asserts of itself that it contains 
                                                          
51 See note 47. 
 
52 Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). 
 
53 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854). 
 
54  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Although Hegel was older than Schelling, 
his most important works appeared only later than those of Schelling. 
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the knowledge of all truth and that it reproduces the totality of the natural and the 
spiritual world from within itself. Hegel wants to take as his point of departure a 
thought completely free of content, and then make ‘negation’ the vehicle of 
dialectical progress. By means of a series of cavortings of this sort, he hoped to 
rise up to an eventual lofty end.  
 16. But come off it. Hegel’s system and its pretensions have been exposed. 
A system that was only some decades ago still generally praised as the highest 
achievement of human inquiry, is today generally damned as the most extreme 
degeneration of human thought. This is a good sign. And we have quite generally 
good grounds, too, for believing that our own age is the beginning of a new period 
of development. 
 The conviction that the most recent systems have no value whatsoever, 
leads quite naturally to attempts to return to older thinkers, and to find a more 
fruitful starting point in their works, of just the sort which in the Middle Ages was 
found in Aristotle. Some begin this search with Kant and see in him, as it were, the 
‘Aristotle of the modern age’. Our historical considerations show, however, that 
this is undeserved. Neither what preceded him, nor what he himself taught, nor 
what came after him, give him anything like the sort of position in the history of 
philosophy which is comparable to that of the Stagirite in antiquity. 
 Herbart writes that Kant struck a spark that could have ignited a light, but 
that his legacy lay in the hands of a dissolute band. In other words, Herbart admits 
that directly after Kant things went worse than they had ever been before. But then 
why, one must ask, did this whole band become so dissolute in the wake of Kant? 
Would it not be something unheard of in the history of science that, immediately 
after the one who showed the right way, and indeed in consequence of his 
influence, everything was suddenly subject to errors more terrible than ever 
before? 
 Shall we allow ourselves to be misled by such arguments and by many 
others that have come to influence the opinion of our contemporaries? Truly not! 
If our time is to be praised as one that has rejuvenated itself in philosophy, then 
this is to proclaim the truth that it has at the same time entered into a new 
childhood. But then its judgment can be of no great certainty. Moreover, through 
its sudden shifts and changes, contemporary public opinion bears manifold 
testimony against itself. Yesterday, people celebrated the ethical doctrine of 
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compassion of a Schopenhauer. Today, they despise Schopenhauer, paying 
homage rather to Nietzsche’s inhuman ideas regarding the Übermensch.55 On the 
other hand, many of the best minds of our day have already emancipated 
themselves from the fashionable view in relation to Kant. Herbert Spencer, just to 
mention one of the most respected philosophers, has arrived at an opinion of Kant 
very much similar to my own, and he and I have arrived at this view quite 
independently. More than once have I heard scholars to whom I declared my 
estimation of Kant’s philosophy exclaim: ‘Exactly! How glad I am to hear that 
from you. My conviction is completely identical, but this is something one is not 
allowed to confess.’ Such fear is unknown to me. On the contrary, I think it is a 
scientific responsibility to express openly our true opinion of such important 
questions. 
 It is also instructive to see how philosophers who attempted to reform 
philosophy by going back to Kant have had no sort of success. And to see how 
even those who choose him as their master see themselves at the same time as 
constrained to admit that Kant’s philosophy cannot be taken all of a piece. While 
they praise some works, especially the Critique of Pure Reason, they condemn 
others especially the Critique of Practical Reason. This is Schopenhauer’s opinion 
and this, as I have said already, Lorm’s. This means that after Kant had allegedly 
shown the right way, not only were his followers led into errors, but even he 
changed to the wrong track just after he supposedly had found exactly the right 
way to proceed! Does this not sound strange beyond all measure?  
 But there is more: Whole parts of the Critique of Pure Reason have been set 
aside as untenable and worthless. Those parts which survive this thinning process 
are then alone awarded lasting significance, but then these, in turn, are declared to 
be in need of certain modifications. The views of a thus modified Kantianism are 
then identified with certain intuitions and opinions to which modern natural 
science has led, as for example with Johannes Müller’s doctrine of the ‘specific 
energies of the senses’ or with the hypothesis of innate ideas and judgments of 
Haeckel and other Darwinists, or with Du Bois-Reymond’s doctrine of the limits 
of our knowledge of nature. Lorm, too, proceeds in no other fashion. 
 A more exact investigation shows however that what is here seen as being 
essentially identical is in fact such as to lack any deeper affinities. Müller’s 
                                                          
55 See Brentano’s Die Lehre Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung, Leipzig 1921, p. 129. [note 
by O. Kraus]. 
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conception of the specific energies of the senses has nothing to do with Kant’s 
doctrine of space and time as the a priori forms of sensation; the idea of sensory 
energies is rather much more closely related to Lockean, and traditional empiricist, 
views on the subjective character of sensory qualities.56 The doctrine of inborn 
thoughts of Haeckel and other Darwinists-a doctrine, let us add, that is contrary to 
experience-has nothing to do with Kant’s a priori concepts and judgments, which 
are, as is known, supposed to be derived from no experience at all, not even from 
that of our ancestors. The doctrine of Du Bois-Reymond, finally, can in no way be 
connected to the Kantian teaching that the Ding an sich is unknowable, and that a 
priori synthetic knowledge is inapplicable to transcendent questions. The only 
connecting point between them might be this: that both philosophers insisted that 
human knowledge has certain limits. But this idea had been taught already by the 
old empiricist school, who also made a series of detailed discoveries about it on 
the basis of psychological considerations.57 The fact is, however, that people in 
general do not know enough about these earlier thinkers, and thus Kant is often 
counted as the original source of what he in fact borrowed from others and merely 
made impure through various admixtures. Thus it is often held that Kant was the 
first who established a harmony between philosophy and the investigation of 
nature. The two must, however, have already been in harmony with each other to 
such a degree that Lavoisier, in his famous work (one still fundamental for 
chemistry even today), could quote a long deliberation from Condillac on the 
correct mode of research, in which it is pointed out that he, Lavoisier, had 
followed this in his own investigations and had found it to have proved itself 
thoroughly.58 
 Let us return, then, to the genuine, more articulate sources. Let us seek to 
join up with the achievements of the first ascending phase of development. What 
we find there is real groundwork as well as that same sound, healthy method 
which will make it possible for us to continue successfully the work of our 
                                                          
56 Thomas Young applied the hypothesis of the special sensory energies to the field of 
optics much earlier, and more consistently, than J. Müller. It seems, too, that we can exclude any 
influence on him of German philosophy. 
 
57 See for instance Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, chapter IV, section 
3. 
 
58 Lavoisier, Traité élémentaire de chimie, Paris 1789. Part One, Discours préliminaire, pp. 
V and XXXI. 
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ancestors.  
 17. Something similar can be said of the achievements of the ascending 
phases of earlier periods. I have in mind, in particular, the achievements of ancient 
philosophy. This had, in contrast to modern times, the advantage of an ascending 
period of longer duration, so that it was able to reach what is in many respect a 
richer stock of results. Even today there are many things which can best be learned 
from Aristotle.59 
 As for the medieval period, it must be said that, as Leibniz already 
recognized,60 its results are not of the same value as those of antiquity and 
modernity. In fact there was never present within it an interest fully devoted to free 
and rational inquiry. Philosophy was treated as ancilla theologiae (as ‘maid of 
theology’). Only relatively, therefore, can it be said of the first phase of this period 
that it manifested a pure theoretical interest. It is certain that this served to hinder 
development, that it held inquiry back from important investigations in the 
subsequent epoch and encouraged that degeneration into senseless subtleties that 
is characteristic of the first stage of decline. Thus, the return to the philosophy of 
the Middle Ages cannot be seen as being of the same worth as the return to other 
periods. It would, moreover, be an absolute disaster if one were to see this period 
as exemplary because one wanted once more to bring philosophy into the same 
subservient relation to theology.61 
 18. It is not only in the history of philosophy, ancient and modern, that we 
are to seek new starting points, however, but also in the achievements of other 
sciences, and especially in those of mathematics and the natural sciences, which 
today enjoy such intensive development. Everything in science stands in 
                                                          
59 At the same time Brentano declares Aristotle’s philosophy as a whole to be untenable, see 
his Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung, p. IV [note by O. Kraus]. 
 
60 As Leibniz said, ‘I know that the books of the Scholastics are full of nonsense, but there 
is gold hidden under this straw.’ 
 
61 In the original lecture, I had inserted at this point a passage addressing the Austrian 
Ministry of Education. According to the information of the Vienna University News, the Minister 
had refused in his decision concerning the Chair of Philosophy to take into consideration the 
proposals of the faculty. Instead, he had attempted, consciously, and clearly against his own 
better judgement, to secure the appointment to full professor in the University of Vienna, in a 
position reserved for me for some 14 years, for a scholastic philosopher, an examiner in the 
archbishop’s academy in Breslau. On grounds similar to the ones I mentioned in the introduction 
(see note 3), I removed this passage, too, from the printed version of my lecture. 
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interrelation to everything else, after all. That is why we find essential 
contributions even to philosophy in the works of eminent mathematicians and 
natural scientists. To mention just one of these, the development of the theory of 
probability was able to solve certain logical problems in such a way that Hume’s 
skeptical concerns could be completely resolved, and in fact they have been 
resolved–and in such a way as to make no use at all of those unnatural means to 
which Reid and Kant thought it necessary to appeal.62 
 19. The path to higher realms–the path along which Kant invited us to enter, 
not through the door of intellectual insight, but rather, in the strangest fashion, by 
breaking in by means of that unbelievable act of blind belief–is thus no longer 
barred, as had earlier seemed to be the case. It is true that knowledge has, and will 
always have, its limits. In relation to many questions, answers can be given only 
on the basis of probability; in relation to other questions, we can achieve not even 
this to any considerable degree. But even if all our knowledge is fragmentary, still, 
it is an imposing fragment. Man is the most wondrous among all the living 
creatures, wrote Sophocles; and science, as Goethe said, is ‘the highest faculty of 
man’. This faculty has often led him further than he had ever hoped in his wildest 
dreams, and so may it be the case even in relation to those highest questions.  
 Without knowing what the essence of matter is, we have nonetheless 
established that matter is essentially incorruptible; without knowing what the 
essence of mind is, we might yet be able to show that we have a well-grounded 
hope that the soul enjoys everlasting existence. Without knowing the essence of 
the first cause of the material world, still we must work through to a rational 
conviction that the world is determined for the best–by this cause. By this means 
also we shall have gained an answer to the question of optimism in a way that 
truly corresponds to the needs of our nature. 
 Lorm rightly recognizes that the pessimistic objections of Schopenhauer and 
Hartmann have no scientific value. The one is based on an absurd metaphysics, the 
other simply on a superficial and prejudiced list of events that, considered in 
themselves, would have to be counted as supporting pessimistic conclusions. For 
Lorm, the only real basis for scientific pessimism is the sad discrepancy between 
the intellectual needs of man on the one hand, and his capacity to satisfy them on 
the other, a discrepancy that seemed to arise as a result of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason. Even this objection, however, appears implausible. 
                                                          
62 See Brentano’s Versuch über Erkenntnis, Leipzig 1925, pp. 160ff. [note by O. Kraus]. 
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 20. Nevertheless, we still have other and perhaps greater objections. Thus 
there is the objection that points to the disteleology in the organic world and to the 
absence of any teleological character in the inorganic realm. But look, recent 
investigations in biology have reconstructed our conceptions in a way that is 
sharply opposed to earlier results. Huxley,63 the most celebrated biologist of our 
day, declares on the basis of the Darwinian theory of evolution that the material 
world, in its original structure, seems to display a certain sort of teleology. The 
same view was recently propounded also by the great Ernst von Baer,64 and by 
Lamarck65 when he gave the first impulse to the evolutionary movement at the 
beginning of the century. And this means, then, that a teleological character 
comprehends equally the organic and the inorganic nature.  
 Other objections have been put forward, too, as for example that which 
relates to the necessarily finite character of creation;66 then, the objection that 
refers to the small number of the dimensions of space,67 and another that predicts 
                                                          
63 See Thomas Huxley’s The Problems of Geology, vol. IV, in which he argues against 
Haeckel. Among the German Darwinists it is especially Weismann who definitively stresses the 
necessity of a basic teleological structure of the universe. 
 
64 Karl Ernst von Baer, Studien aus dem Gebiete der Naturwissenschaft, 2nd edition, 
Braunschweig 1886, parts II, IV, and V. 
 
65 Jean-Baptiste Pierre Antoine De Monet De Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique, 1819. 
 
66 With respect to a possible solution of this problem, I expressed my opinion some time 
ago in a short poem: 
 
The Best of All Possible Worlds 
 
You say: ‘The world must be the best of all: 
The best chooses the best when he creates.’  
Another: ‘She is not the best, oh no! 
For otherwise she would be the measure of God’s power.’ 
But listen, the two of you who quarrel thus! 
Is the world? --No! The world becomes 
And in becoming goes beyond all measure 
And, endlessly distant, 
She strives from likeness to likeness  
T’wards the unreachably high image of the Lord. 
 
67 As a response to this argument, it would be natural to refer to the fact that, beside our 
field of experience, there might be ‘subspaces’ and ‘superimposed spaces’ (if we are allowed to 
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the coming annihilation of the Earth and other possibly inhabited planets; and, 
finally, the objection that refers to the law of entropy and to the feared state of an 
ultimate winding-down of all natural processes, or at least of all higher forms of 
natural processes.68 Others raise the problem which arises when, in accordance 
with what theodicy must demand, one regards evil in itself as something purely 
negative, or on the other hand as something which arises only out of the 
association of essentially good elements.69 At this point, the investigation enters 
the most subtle problems of a theory of categories. 
 It is clear, then, that the question of optimism is, in its various ramifications, 
a most complex one. On the other hand, there is not one of the knots in the web of 
difficulties by which one is here confronted, which cannot be untied. Indeed, 
untying each knot brings with it new and advantageous discoveries, never before 
hoped for, so that the view of the old optimist Heraclitus70 is confirmed: ‘The 
hidden harmony is stronger (or, ‘better’) than the visible.’ 
 Every single one of the most important philosophers of the ascending 
periods were, as history teaches, optimists. Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and 
Thomas Aquinas, and also Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz have each achieved a 
great deal in this respect, and this is something which deserves our gratitude. And 
it is simply not acceptable to compare, as Lorm dares to do, their optimistic views 
with the pessimistic views of our most recent philosophers. We can certainly hope, 
however, that whatever those philosophers left still to do, will be accomplished by 
us or by our successors.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
introduce these expressions), each of which possesses a certain number of dimensions [different 
from those with which we are familiar]. Spinoza, for instance, did not find any difficulty in 
attributing a variety of other dimensions to his substance, in addition to zero-dimensional 
thinking and to three-dimensional extension. This idea, however, only leads to new difficulties. 
For, by accepting the thesis of multidimensionality, the danger cannot be dispelled that our 
universe might become decomposed, just as a bad tragedy (to use a striking expression of 
Aristotle, see Metaphysics, 1090 b 19) collapses into sheer episodes. In the present context, 
however, we cannot show how this objection, too, can be refuted. 
 
68 For this view see for instance the popular lectures by Helmholtz: ‘On the Interaction of 
Natural Forces’ (read in 1854), and ‘On the Origin of the Solar System’ (read in 1871). 
 
69 This problem was already recognized by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. 
 
70 Heraclitus of Ephesus, the most talented Ionian philosopher of nature, highly respected by 
Socrates himself, flourished c. 500 BC. 
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 21. Any act of knowledge implies freedom and redemption. This will hold 
especially of that kind of knowledge which takes into account, in a manner 
satisfying to our nature, what we experience as evil in the world. For pessimistic 
anxieties are the most tragic of the nightmares by which mankind is affected. 
 The religion of our people, with its doctrine of an omnipotent and 
omnibenevolent Father of all, is essentially optimistic. Only under the banner of 
optimism was it able to win for itself the world, or rather, that part of humanity 
which has become the bearer of world-history. Admittedly, there are signs that this 
victory might not be a permanent one. However, even if this greatest of all cultural 
phenomena should disappear, still this would not happen in such a way that its 
place would be left simply vacant; still less could it be replaced with a pessimistic 
world-view. Whatever replaces it, whatever achieves an enduring victory over it, 
must be explicitly optimistic, and must be in a position to give a better account of 
the world than that which was given by Christianity with its doctrine of original 
sin and of redemption by the Saviour. This revolution will be a similar one to that 
which gave rise to the Christian epoch, when the existing ritual law, which had 
hitherto been considered the essence of religion, fell. And behold: the real essence 
was preserved intact and emerged in a purified and clarified form. In this way, too, 
much may fall away again which is at the moment regarded as essential. I know, 
when I say this, that many noble persons will feel offended by my words, just as 
the benevolent adherents of circumcision were offended by Saint Paul. But the 
three words of faith, as Schiller called them, will only resound in the soul all the 
more mightily, and will all the more benevolently shape man’s inner and outer life.  
 God grant all these things! And I trust that he will grant them. 
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